

302183

JPRS-TAC-85-032

19 September 1985

## Worldwide Report

# ARMS CONTROL

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;  
Distribution Unlimited

FBIS

19980722 127

**FBIS**

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY  
NATIONAL TECHNICAL  
INFORMATION SERVICE  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

10  
74  
A4

#### NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

#### PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

19 September 1985

**WORLDWIDE REPORT  
ARMS CONTROL**

**SDI AND SPACE ARMS**

Gorbachev, U.S. Senators Discuss SDI, Summit, Test Moratorium (Moscow TASS, 4 Sep 85) .....	1
TASS Reports Meeting	1
TASS Cites Byrd	3
USSR: Late August Reports, Comment on Allies' Response to SDI (Various sources, various dates) .....	4
Weinberger LE POINT Interview	4
West European Spacelab Role	5
FRG Government-Business Conference	6
FRG Defense Minister Criticized	6
Mitterrand-Kohl Talks	8
French Defense Minister Rejects Involvement	8
U.S.-UK Secret Talks, Contracts	8
Disagreements in Canada	9
Japanese-U.S. Agreement Planned	11
Abrahamson Seeks Italian Participation	12
Belgian Trade Unions Opposed	12
FRG's Brandt Urges Government To Oppose Space Arms (Hamburg DPA, 1 Sep 85) .....	14
FRG Defense Minister Demands European Defense Initiative (Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 5 Sep 85) .....	15
Italy's Spadolini Views Participation in SDI Research (Rome ANSA, 29 Aug 85) .....	16
Milan Summit on Eureka, French Proposals (Paris AFP SCIENCES, 4 Jul 85) .....	17

Belgium's Science Minister on Eureka, SDI Prospects (Frank De Moor; Brussels KNACK, 17 Jul 85).....	23
Davignon, Tindemans Comment on Eureka Program (Etienne Davignon, Leo Tindemans Interview; Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE, 17 Jul 85).....	28
Most Austrians Take Wait-and-See Position on Eureka (Hedi Cech; Vienna DIE PRESSE, 12 Jul 85).....	35
Japanese Experts Headed to U.S. for SDI Discussions (Tokyo MAINICHI SHIMBUN, 4 Aug 85).....	38
<b>Briefs</b>	
FRG's SDI Delegation in U.S.	40
FRG Government Grant to Eureka	40
<b>SALT/START ISSUES</b>	
USSR: Late August Comments, Reports on MX Program (Moscow TASS, 22, 23 Aug 85).....	42
Implications for U.S.-Soviet Relations	42
First-Strike Capability Sought	43
Ninth Test Conducted	44
TASS: Rockwell International Awarded B-1 Contract (Moscow TASS, 16 Aug 85).....	45
<b>INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES</b>	
BMEWS Improvement Described (V. Pavlov; Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 5, May 85).....	47
U.S. Second Generation Cruise Missiles Discussed (V. Kirsanov; Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 5, May 85).....	49
French Nuclear Buildup Discussed (E. Zorin; Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 5, May 85).....	54
FRG Reports Claims U.S. Neutron Bombs To Be Deployed (Hamburg DPA, 3 Sep 85).....	56
'Monitor' Program Carries Story Defense Ministry Denies Story	56

## CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

- Western Nations, Japan Meet on Chemical Weapons  
(Melbourne Overseas Service, 11 Sep 85)..... 57
- FRG's Woerner Defends Role of Chemical Weapons  
(Manfred Woerner; Cologne Westdeutscher Rundfunk  
Television Network, 5 Sep 85)..... 58
- Briefs  
FRG Party Opposed Weapons Storing 61

## NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

- TASS: U.S. Opposes, USSR Supports Nuclear-Free North Europe  
(Moscow TASS, 9 Aug 85)..... 62
- TASS Criticizes Norway Opposition to North Europe Zone  
(Moscow TASS, 27 Aug 85)..... 63
- USSR: Greece Wants U.S. Bases Out as Part of Balkan NFZ Plan  
(Moscow PRAVDA, 25 Aug 85)..... 65
- Soviet Paper Notes Japanese Prefecture NFZ  
(Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, No 33, 14 Aug 85)..... 67
- Sydney Editorial Lauds Rarotonga Treaty  
(Editorial; Sydney THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, 10 Aug 85).... 68

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

GORBACHEV, U.S. SENATORS DISCUSS SDI, SUMMIT, TEST MORATORIUM

TASS Reports Meeting

LD031333 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Sep 85 First Edition p 1

[TASS report: "M. S. Gorbachev Receives U.S. Senators"]

[Text] On 3 September Mikhail Gorabachev, general secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., received in the Kremlin U.S. Senate Democratic leader Robert Byrd, President Pro Tempore of the Senate Strom Thurmond, and Senators Claiborne Pell, Sam Nunn, Dennis De Concini, Paul Sarbanes, John Warner and George Mitchell. The senators are staying in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Parliamentary Group of the USSR.

During the meeting, Mikhail Gorbachev appraised the present state of Soviet-American relations and the international situation as a whole.

The Soviet Union, he said, sincerely stands for returning Soviet-American relations into the channel of normal, correct, and mutually advantageous cooperation, for pursuing a constructive dialogue between our countries, and for establishing at least a minimum of mutual trust and respect for the legitimate interests of each country.

It was stressed that the main task today is to put an end to the arms race and to ensure a turn toward peaceful development and mutually advantageous cooperation. The state of affairs in the sphere of security is the decisive factor in Soviet-American relations. That is why it is here above all that the search for agreements on really major, central problems should be carried on. These are primarily the questions being discussed at the Geneva negotiations on space and nuclear arms, as well as measures of military detente and building up trust in the broadest sense.

The Soviet people's intensive creative life and the far-reaching plans of our peaceful construction effort all determine the peaceable character of the USSR's foreign policy.

The attention of the U.S. senators was drawn to the important peace initiatives the Soviet Union has put foward recently, including the moratorium imposed by the Soviet side on nuclear blasts and the call addressed to the United States that it follow suit, as well as the proposal tabled by the USSR at the United Nations on international cooperation in peaceful exploration of outer space under the conditions of its nonmilitarization.

The implementation of these proposals would contribute to a radical resolution of the long-ripe problems of space and nuclear armaments and strengthening mutual trust and military detente, and would be a good incentive for practical advancement towards the ultimate goal: the elimination of nuclear weapons completely and everywhere, strengthening international security and universal peace.

These initiatives have met with worldwide approval. Many people see in them real hope for ending, at last, the nuclear weapons race and keeping outer space free from weapons. Prominent scientists and public figures, including those in the United States, call for responding to these bold initiatives of the USSR. Such voices can also be heard at the U.S. Congress, which could, certainly, make a no small contribution to the resolution of outstanding problems between our countries.

The USSR and the United States Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out, are the biggest military powers and will, to all appearances, remain such. Neither of the sides will resign itself to the other side gaining a stable or decisive superiority. One cannot help drawing a conclusion from that -- no test of strength shall be held, things should not be brought to a dangerous confrontation. [Moscow TASS in Russian at 1218 GMT and Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1200 GMT on 3 September in similar reports render the preceding sentence as follows: Only one way out of this suggests itself -- no test of strength shall be held, things should not be brought to a dangerous confrontation. --

The positions of our two countries on a number of issues do not coincide, which is predetermined by the principled distinctions between our two systems. But however deep these distinctions may be, they should not, cannot, obstruct the main thing: our responsibility for averting the nuclear threat, for preserving peace.

Mikhail Gorbachev noted the importance of the development of contacts between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the U.S. congress, stressing that those contacts were called upon to serve the interests of peace and the interests of the normalization of relations between the two countries.

Touching upon the Soviet-U.S. summit, on which an agreement had been reached, Mikhail Gorbachev emphasized that the Soviet side is going to that meeting with sincere goodwill and with a desire to do everything possible to strengthen peace. It is necessary that the meeting satisfy not only the peoples of our countries, but the peoples of the whole world. If the U.S. side, too, displays goodwill, the meeting can produce positive results.

Senator Robert Byrd and other U.S. senators voiced thanks for a clear presentation of the Soviet position and noted the usefulness of the conversation that had been held and the need for extending dialogue, improving the atmosphere in relations between the two countries, and for the development of mutually beneficial contacts between them in different fields. They called for the success of the forthcoming summit. At the same time, the American side repeated well-known arguments that boil down in large measure to justification of the U.S. Administration's course of whipping up the arms race, *inter alia*, in space.

Mikhail Gorbachev stressed in this context the need for a responsible and serious approach of statesmen, including parliamentarians, to questions of vital importance to the peoples of the two countries and to the peoples of the whole world.

The participants in the conversation included Avgust Voss, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Vadim Zagladin, deputy chairman of the Soviet Parliamentary Group, and Andrey Aleksandrov, a member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

TASS Cites Byrd

LD041312 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1239 GMT 4 Sep 85

[Text] Washington, 4 Sep TASS -- Commenting on the reception by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, of the group of American senators, R. Byrd, leader of the Democratic Party group in the U.S. Senate, said in an interview to NBC television: "We went to the USSR in order to start a Soviet-American dialogue, and it seems to us that we achieved our goal. The Soviet leader is a businesslike, firm, and capable person, who expresses his thoughts clearly and concisely. He made a very good impression on me personally. I left the meeting in a much more optimistic mood than I was in before it. Our meeting lasted for 3 and 1/2 hours, which, in itself, shows how interested the Soviet leadership is in dialogue and in good relations."

Answering a question on the Soviet position on basic international problems, the senator remarked: "The Soviet leader made it clear to us that progress must be made during the Geneva meeting, and that we must avoid war. He also made it clear that as soon as an agreement has been reached on the 'star wars' program and it lies on the table in the form that the Russians have been aiming for, the Soviet side will be ready to make radical proposals, as M.S. Gorbachev put it, in arms reduction. The Soviet leader sharply criticized the very concept of 'star wars,' pointing out that it is a first-strike weapon."

M.S. Gorbachev, Byrd said in conclusion, "gave proof of his interest, and I want to stress once again, in Soviet-American dialogue. He is awaiting the meeting in Geneva."

CSO: 5200/1387

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

**USSR: LATE AUGUST REPORTS, COMMENT ON ALLIES' RESPONSE TO SDI**

**Weinberger LE POINT Interview**

**LD261546 Moscow TASS in English 1530 GMT 26 Aug 85**

**[ "Of Advertisements and Blackmail for Western Europe"--TASS headline]**

**[Text] Moscow, August 26 TASS--By TASS military writer Bladimir Chernyshev:**

Speaking in an interview to the French magazine LE POINT, U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger tried, yet another time, to persuade Western Europeans to participate in Washington's "star wars" program.

European experts and technological capabilities of Western European countries, he maintained, are simply indispensable for the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative", and work carried out within its framework is likely to produce "common benefit". Having borrowed from the advertising agencies of New York's Madison Avenue the cheapest tricks used in marketing shoddy merchandise, the Pentagon chief praised to the skies the mythical "benefits" of the "star wars" plan. True, the secretary showed his individuality as well -- unlike well-trained advertising agency staff he could not refrain from making threatening hints for Western Europeans to hear.

For instance, how can one evaluate in any other way his statement to the effect that many influential persons in the United States held the view that it was time to say 'good-bye' to NATO, as Europeans are not doing enough in that field. It is time, he said, that they in Western European capitals "came to their senses" and began to toe the U.S. policy line obediently in all of its aspects, otherwise, the point of view of the afore-mentioned "many influential persons" could prevail in Washington.

So, Washington is unwilling to stop its efforts to draw Western Europeans at any cost into its "star" adventure, to sweep them into its aggressive, offensive plan for attaining an illusory aim -- that of achieving strategic military superiority over the Soviet Union and its allies. Western Europeans are insistently invited, with some threats thrown in, to participate in the effort to upset strategic stability, in the useless and dangerous squandering of material and intellectual resources.

The present U.S. Administration is trying to win the solidarity of Western Europe with Washington's actions aimed at creating the situation whereby the basis for the process of arms limitation and reduction will be destroyed, whereby it will become impossible to reach any new agreements in that field.

The leadership of the United States plans to use Western European brains and technological breakthroughs for ensuring a "multi-tiered" defense of the U.S. territory and warding off a retaliatory attack. As to Western Europe, it will be left with only a semblance of some kind of defense. "Security zones" are to be established in NATO at different levels, at a high level for the United States and at a much lower level for its allies.

Planning different kinds of "limited" nuclear wars that are to be fought at big distances from the American territory, the U.S. leadership invites Western Europeans to take part in the American program which dooms them to the role of nuclear and space hostages of Washington.

Despite promises and threats made by U.S. Administration officials, sober-minded political figures in the United States and Western Europe alike are well aware of all this.

They describe the "Strategic Defense Initiative" as a bad and dangerous deception, a financial and technological nightmare and a destabilizing factor as well as an offensive military strategy. Its realization, they warn, will result in the worst world imaginable -- a world where an unreliable defense and the escalation of offensive systems would come together.

Given a sober-minded and responsible approach to the situation that has taken shape in the world, efforts should be directed not at drawing anybody into the "star wars" program but at renouncing these delirious plans at all. For they are too dangerous for the whole of mankind!

#### **West European Spacelab Role**

**PM281311 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Aug 85 First Edition p 5**

[Igor Andreyev "Commentator's Column": "Preparing Them for the Role of 'Sub-contractors'"]

[Text] "Is our Spacelab for the American Strategic Defense Initiative Project?" Headlines like this appeared in many West European newspapers the other day. What specifically do they mean?

A number of West European countries, which have pooled their efforts to create the Spacelab, have been engaged for a long time in fruitless talks with the United States, seeking the status of an equal partner and not simply a "supplier of funds." The point is that Spacelab has twice been put into orbit by an American spaceship, but this cooperation, as the French newspaper LE MONDE put it, "left many Europeans with a bitter taste in their mouth."

Now the West European countries' sense of dissatisfaction with their secondary role is augmented by outright alarm. This is caused by reports about the planned use of Spacelab in June 1987 to carry out broad tests on American laser weapons within the framework of the notorious "star wars" program.

In Bonn, whose specialists head the work to create the space laboratory, and also in other capitals involved in the joint project, objections and protests have been heard. K. Voigt, a Social Democratic Party of Germany Bundestag deputy, stated that such pretensions on the part of the Pentagon break the existing written agreement about the

use of Spacelab exclusively for peaceful purposes. Even the Free Democratic Party, the junior partner in the ruling coalition on the Rhine, has expressed its displeasure. Its expert on scientific research policy, R. Kohn, demanded that the chancellor, in conjunction with the other West European partners, give guarantees of the peaceful utilization of the laboratory.

Let us suppose that Bonn and the other NATO capitals, overcoming the opposition of their own manufacturers of sophisticated weapons and weakening the fetters of "Atlantic solidarity," agree to such guarantees. It is quite useless to count on obtaining similar guarantees from Washington. It is naive to expect such guarantees from a government which is engaged in creating space strike weapons and with whose blessing it is planned to carry out tests on the ASAT antisatellite system and whose government has tested already the interception of Minuteman missile warheads at an altitude of 160 km.

Only "guarantees" of a different kind can be expected from the Washington administration today. It is trying to do everything possible to ensure that Spacelab becomes, in every sense of the word, a satellite of the sinister "star wars" program. This sad fact, alas, is recognized by many West European politicians, who are coming to recognize U.S. space adventurism increasingly clearly.

#### FRG Government-Business Conference

LD171346 Moscow TASS in English 1322 GMT 17 Aug 85

[Text] Bonn, August 17 TASS -- The cabinet of Helmut Kohl is taking a course towards drawing West German companies and research institutions into the realization of the U.S. military space programme. This is evidenced by a two-day conference which has been held here by representatives of the government of the FRG as well as of leading companies and research institutes. Concrete matters aimed at concluding an inter-governmental treaty with the United States on the FRG's participation in Reagan's notorious "star wars" programme were being worked out during the conference.

Although official spokesmen maintain that the government will not be in a hurry to make a final decision, it is pointed out here: certain circles in the ruling top leadership and economic spheres seek to speed up the adoption of a final decision. It has already been announced that early in September this year a delegation of high-ranking representatives of the government and industry will go to Washington in order to find out on the spot conditions for the FRG's participation in the implementation of the "star wars" plans.

Such a hurry is explained by Bonn's endeavour to fully side with Washington before the start of the upcoming Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Geneva and to support the stand of the rabid advocates of militarization of outer space in the Washington administration.

#### FRG Defense Minister Criticized

LD301629 Moscow TASS in English 1606 GMT 30 Aug 85

[Text] Moscow, 30 Aug (TASS)--TASS military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

West German Defence Minister Woerner is constantly preoccupied with the "star wars" programme, afraid to be late and hurrying to involve his country in the race in attack space weapons and further to "fortify" the Washington-Bonn militarist axis. The minister does not spare his time either: Going home from a vacation in Canada, he "dropped in" at the Pentagon to discuss "a more precise schedule" of consultations between the USA and West Germany at a governmental level on Bonn's participation in the implementation of the U.S. "star wars" program.

Way back in 1984, addressing a meeting of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, Woerner said that the SDI program was leading to the destabilization of the strategic situation, contributing to the escalation of another round of the arms race, and also tended to create "zones of diminished security in NATO." However, he did not stick long to that position. Bonn's role of Washington's "general representative" in Western Europe made it impossible for him to have an independent opinion. Also, the defence minister promptly realized that West Germany's participation in the "star wars" program would equate it in "rights" with Britain and France, substantially diminishing the edge the latter have as European nuclear powers. Moreover, there seemed to be a possibility to reach the long desired but forbidden goal, that of involvement in the development of nuclear weapons.

Indeed, Bonn knows that, despite all the protestations of U.S. officials that the strategic Defence Initiative will make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete," Washington is developing third-generation nuclear weapons under the "star wars" program. Last but not least, the minister also has a "responsibility" to the West German military-industrial complex, avid for fat profits which it can slice off the multi-billion "star pie."

That is why the minister shed his scepticism over the SDI and wholeheartedly embraced a pro-American stand. Now he is in a hurry and grumbles that "the train has already started" while the West German Government is still thinking "whether it is on the right tracks." He openly stated at a U.S.-West German meeting in Dallas, USA, this year that West Germany supported the SDI research program. Woerner is fully in solidarity with Chancellor Kohl, who said in the Bundestag on April 18 that the U.S. research program was justified and politically necessary.

Necessary for whom? For the West Germans? No, for Washington, which is dreaming about military-strategic superiority and the development of a first nuclear strike potential, planning all sorts of "limited" nuclear wars and hoping for impunity. Opposition spokesmen have characterized this policy of the West German Federal Government as an outrageous evidence to kowtowing to the United States. Support for the "star wars" program, U.S. Senator Proxmire pointed out, actually brought about the defeat of the ruling party in the local elections in Northern Rhine-Westphalia.

It should be added that participation in the "star Wars" program is contrary to West Germany's national interests, casts it in the role of Washington's "hostage" and supplier of scientific and technological know-how and financial resources to the United States, and makes the Federal Republic an accomplice of those who are planning to blow up the process of arms limitation and reduction and to plunge the world into a nuclear catastrophe.

Bonn's emissaries, who are compiling and concerting a "schedule" for the involvement of their country in Washington's "star" ventures, should have realized this long ago.

Mitterrand-Kohl Talks

PM261237 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Aug 85 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Differences Remain"]

[Text] Paris, 25 Aug -- Talks have been held between President F. Mitterrand and FRG Chancellor H. Kohl at Bregancon castle in the south of France. No final communique has been published but political observers believe that the meeting paid great attention to a discussion of Reagan's "star wars" plans. Definite differences exist between the two countries with regard to this militarist plan. It is fully supported by the FRG's present right-wing conservative government.

Meanwhile Paris, which rejects Reagan's project, defends its own "Eureka" program, which is designed to ensure the West European countries' greater independence in the space technology sphere.

F. Mitterrand and H. Kohl were unable to smooth over differences regarding the joint development of a "European fighter for the nineties." Several months ago this project caused such fierce arguments among the five West European countries involved that France and Spain dissociated themselves from the agreement signed by the FRG, Britain, and Italy and even threatened to begin creating their own model.

There was also a discussion of questions connected with "Common Market" problems where France and the FRG disagree strongly, primarily on trade in agricultural products.

**French Defense Minister Rejects Involvement**

LD140730 Moscow TASS in English 0715 GMT 14 Aug 85

[Text] Vienna, August 14 TASS -- France's Defence Minister Charles Hernu said in an Austrian television interview that his country did not intend to take any part in projects in connection with the implementation of the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative. He stressed in that connection that France, which is a member of the North Atlantic alliance, is no member of the NATO's military wing.

The French Government's attitude to the Strategic Defence Initiative, Charles Hernu pointed out, is "extremely cautious" and it does not intend to "give support to it."

**U.S.-UK Secret Talks, Contracts**

LD271133 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0630 GMT 27 Aug 85

[Text] Our correspondent Sergey Sayneko reports from London:

The newspaper THE SUNDAY TIMES reports that a British official delegation visited the United States last week with the aim of holding secret talks leading to the conclusion of an agreement on British firms' participation in the so-called "star wars" program of the Reagan administration. Both sides are trying to reach an agreement by October, so that President Reagan can speak of real support by his NATO allies at the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva. At the same time, U.S. officials

have stated that the U.S. Congress is unlikely ever to agree to approve British demands for the allocation to British firms of \$1.5 billion from the overall fund for research.

In this regard, apprehension is increasing in British scientific and business circles that American companies and firms will seize all the most advantageous contracts. However, it seems this does little to concern the senior partner across the Atlantic, since the United States tries in every way to involve Great Britain in the network of its research work within the framework of the "star wars" program, and to obtain for itself all the most top-notch things Britain possesses in the scientific and technological field. Moreover, the Americans are trying to avoid all kinds of financial losses.

#### Disagreements in Canada

PM221445 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 32, Aug 85 pp 25-26

[V. Svetlanov article: "Invitation to 'Star Wars'"]

[Text] "Few areas of cooperation between Canada and the United States are as critical as their partnership in defence," THE NEW YORK TIMES said in a recent article entitled "U.S. Weapons Ties Have Mulroney (the Canadian Prime Minister) on the Defensive." Critical for whom -- Canada or its southern neighbour? Does Canadian-American military cooperation strengthen Canada's security?

Questions of this order are being asked with increasing frequency in connection with Reagan's programme for the development of space strike weapons known as his Strategic Defence Initiative and the role allotted Canada in its realization.

The American plans for the use of nuclear weapons are based on the assumption that the U.S. can wage protracted nuclear war and win it, the Canadian GLOBE AND MAIL observes. "Canada's future is intimately linked to U.S. military policy," the paper writes, "and the question of being tied to a system that makes nuclear warfare increasingly 'thinkable' is crucial to the debate on Canadian foreign policy now underway."

The Canadian Government has come out in support of the "research element" of SDI, because, Prime Minister Mulroney said, "We believe it would make negotiations (in Geneva) easier, persuade the other side of serious intent." The Canadian Government seeks to justify its stand by maintaining that, to quote Mulroney again, "to do otherwise would be to undermine the strength of NATO and the strength of our commitment to freedom and democracy."

The question of Canada's practical participation in SDI has been postponed until hearings next autumn in the newly-formed combined parliamentary committee on foreign affairs and national defence. The postponement is due primarily to the wide opposition in the country to the plans for the militarization of outer space and Canada's involvement in them. The departure of the Conservative government from the position taken by former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau met with a sharply negative reaction.

The New Democratic party convention held at the end of June and the beginning of July unanimously endorsed a resolution condemning Reagan's "star wars" programme and calling on the Canadian Government to turn down Washington's "invitation" to join in carrying it out.

More than 700 Canadian scientists from 20 universities have also registered their protest. In a statement addressed to the prime minister they pointed out that the programme would lead to a serious escalation of the arms race and the destabilization of the already delicate balance of nuclear strength in the world. The academics urged the government to reject the Washington proposal and warned that they would have no part in any research connected with SDI if Ottawa nevertheless decided to participate in it.

Opinions differ in the Cabinet itself. John Lamb, executive director of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, has observed that "some ministers are opposed to the "star wars" plan on grounds of strategic danger, and there are others who see advantages to the Canadian economy." And there are still others who feel that any opposition to Reagan could jeopardize Canadian-American relations.

In February Foreign Minister Joseph Clark told the House of Commons (evidently in an attempt to cool down passions and to reassure public opinion and the parliamentary opposition): "With regard to the question of any association with any aspect of the SDI, I can give the members assurance now, as I have before, that there is no plan, current, pending or anticipated, that would have the Government of Canada involved in any way with the Strategic Defence Initiative."

But how does this tally with the position of Defense Minister Erik Nielsen, who said among other things that the government "would be negligent" if it did not consider the "options" that have opened. Commenting on this statement, the GLOBE AND MAIL says: "Not negligent, sensible. The U.S. is gearing up with frightening speed to create a destabilizing weapons system in space." According to Clark, the paper continued, the American research is "only prudent" and does not signify actual deployment which "could have serious implications for arms control." "But let's not be naive," the paper adds, "the SDI research will give a definite momentum to the development of space defence systems, and an unwary Canada could find itself coopted."

Former Defense Minister Robert Coates likewise urged acceptance of the American "invitation." Participation in SDI, he averred, would ensure orders for Canadian industry, increased employment, and access to advanced U.S. technology.

In this connection the GLOBE AND MAIL warned that the more Canadian industry becomes a cog in the U.S. war machine, the less Canada will be able to pursue an independent foreign policy. Ottawa, it observed, could hardly refuse permission for the testing of cruise missiles in Canada when Litton Systems Canada Limited was manufacturing the guidance systems for them in Ontario.

Experts also voice concern over the consequences of the realization of SDI for the Canadian economy inasmuch as all "star wars" developments will be wrapped in such secrecy that Canadian business circles will have no access to them except perhaps at the lowest level. Moreover, the programme would be so costly that any reduction of the U.S. deficit would be ruled out, and this in turn could be disastrous for the Canadian economy.

"Deep in his political heart of hearts, Brian Mulroney must know that his autumn decision on Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative is a no-win trap," a FINANCIAL POST commentator wrote. "It's the kind of ambush politicians drive miles out of their way to avoid."

Another question Canadians are asking themselves is this: Is Canada not already in effect taking part in the realization of SDI? Particular concern is caused by the

Canadian-U.S. agreement concluded this spring on the modernization of the early warning system within the framework of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD).

The total cost of the modernization of the North American air defence system will run to 7 billion Canadian dollars, of which 88 per cent will be covered by the United States and 12 per cent by Canada. At the initial stage it is proposed to update the early warning system set up in the Canadian North in the late fifties. The new system, which will consist of a chain of radar stations, in the northern part of Alaska and Canada, will cost 1.5 billion Canadian dollars. By the end of the decade new landing strips capable of servicing also U.S. AWACS planes and, "in contingencies," F-15 fighter craft are to be added.

Before the Canadian-American agreement was signed, the TORONTO STAR observed editorially: "The forthcoming agreement also could signal a controversial shift in Canadian military activities in line with U.S. wishes. It was the Americans that coaxed a reluctant Canada in changing the A in NORAD a few years ago to mean aerospace and not just air. Only months after the phase-out of nuclear weapons from Canadian forces aircraft, could this revised continental defence arrangement mire us in the development of equally provocative military gear, such as the anti-satellite weaponry being tested aboard U.S. warplanes?"

Arms control expert Lloyd Axworthy, a spokesman of the Liberal opposition, has said: "We're heading into some new alleyways that carry a potential for a major militarization of the North. The idea that this is simply a defensive radar system is absolutely nonsense." And in the opinion of the New Democrat Derek Blackburn, "once we start accepting AWACS and interceptor bombers across the North, we are participating politically in an American offensive strategy. I'm very fearful we are allowing ourselves to get taken in."

The opposition underscores also another problem the Conservative government is faced with at home -- the fears that closer ties with the U.S. might result in Canadian sovereignty being sacrificed to American interests.

Addressing American TV audiences on March 15, Prime Minister Mulroney declared that the Canadian Government would not allow U.S. nuclear weapons to be deployed in Canada. But will this promise be binding on the U.S. Administration, worried Canadians are asking. In this connection MACLEAN's magazine observed that the opponents of the Mulroney government doubt whether, in the light of the "contingency" plans, the U.S. will wait for Ottawa's consent to the deployment of nuclear weapons.

In the coming months Canadians will be discussing the basic aspects of the country's foreign policy. These debates will relate not only to the "star wars" programme but also to the U.S. nuclear strategy associated with it. As the GLOBE AND MAIL observed, "the need for Canada to formulate its own foreign and defence policies, in which planning to wage a nuclear war is out of the question, has never been more urgent."

#### Japanese-U.S. Agreement Planned

LD251237 Moscow TASS in English 1213 GMT 25 Aug 85

[Text] Tokyo, 25 Aug (TASS)--The Nakasone government intends to sign an official agreement with Washington on Japan's joining the American "star wars" programme.

As is reported by the newspaper TOKYO SHIMBUN today, the decision will be announced in October during the visit to Japan of Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger. That agreement will pave the way to broadscale deliveries to the Pentagon of newest Japanese technology to develop space armaments. Earlier Prime Minister Nakasone actually gave permission to private companies of the country to join the research work in the United States within the framework of the "star wars" programme. They are already involved in creating powerful combat lasers with which Washington links its plans of militarisation of the near-earth space.

#### Abrahamson Seeks Italian Participation

LD282204 Moscow TASS in English 2104 GMT 28 Aug 85

[Text] Rome, August 28 TASS -- Lt-Gen James Abrahamson, the head of the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative organization, currently in Rome, has held talks with Defence Minister Giovanni Spadolini and was received by Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi.

He did not conceal, writes the newspaper GIORNALE, that the United States would like to secure the Italian Government's official consent to participation in the "star wars" project and that his trip to Rome attested to the invigoration by Ronald Reagan of the campaign of pressure on the allies. The newspaper points out that a group of American experts will arrive in Italy in ten days within the framework of the pressure campaign.

An overwhelming majority of Italian physicists and space technology experts oppose the American plans to militarize outer space. According to an opinion survey conducted by PANORAMA MESE magazine, 65 per cent of leading scientists polled opposed the "star wars" programme.

#### Belgian Trade Unions Opposed

LD240856 Moscow TASS in English 0825 GMT 24 Aug 85

[Text] Moscow, Aug 24 TASS -- "We come out in favour of removing U.S. cruise missiles from Belgian territory and in favour of delivering the whole of Europe from nuclear weapons and ending the arms race", Andre Van den Broucke, president of the Belgian General Confederation of Labour, has told a correspondent of the newspaper TRUD in Brussels.

"The Belgian General Confederation of Labour takes an active part in the anti-war movement", the interview says. "We were, for example, among the initiators of the convocation of the International Forum for Peace and Security in Europe. Representatives of the public of 27 countries the leaders of which had signed the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, took part in the peace forces' forum which was held in Brussels and Houthalen at the end of February and early in March.

"The Confederation is categorically against the creation of 'star wars' weapons", the Belgian trade union leader emphasizes. "Why? Because from the military and political point of view such a step is another attempt to achieve military superiority and to use it in one's own interests. I am deeply convinced: The realisation of the Strategic Defence Initiative is conducive to destabilisation of peace and to an escalation of military preparations, and not to stronger peace. The way to the strengthening

of security lies in a diametrically opposite direction, with disarmament being its landmark.

"From the socioeconomic point of view, preparation for 'star wars' is the squandering of truly 'cosmic' funds and a hindrance to the development of mankind. We need every dollar, franc or mark to combat the crisis, to create job opportunities, and to raise the living standard.

"Finally, the launching of weapons into space can undermine the very possibility of conducting a peaceful dialogue. The one who wishes the Geneva talks to be a success and comes out in favour of curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament should realize: To strengthen peace and to prepare for 'star wars' are incompatible things".

CSO: 5200/1387

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG'S BRANDT URGES GOVERNMENT TO OPPOSE SPACE ARMS

LD011436 Hamburg DPA in German 0943 GMT 1 Sep 85

[Text] Munich, 1 Sep (DAP) -- In the opinion of SPD Chairman Willy Brandt, the Federal Republic must not participate in the militarization of space. Bonn's international influence must be used to prevent the armed use of space through treaty settlements, Brandt said on Sunday at an event held in Munich to mark antiwar day. The space arms project, of which it is said that it will finally remove the threat of strategic nuclear missiles, "would be a grandiose vision if it did not, on the contrary, produce even more risks," Brandt said. Concern that the development of space weapons will bring less rather than more security is well-founded.

Brandt appealed to the supporters of the peace movement "not to lose direction or become resigned." The Federal Government has not understood that it is faced by a development that makes both German states "to an equal extent a launching ramp and target of more and more nuclear missiles," Brandt said. He did not accuse the Bonn government of not being in favor of peace, but he blamed them for "lacking in courageous and uncomfortable disarmament initiatives." It is because of this that it felt pressure from a people that has become restless. "If those currently in power in Bonn are not capable of this, then the future government must ensure that superfluously deployed missiles are negotiated away again," Brandt said.

Brandt called for a new phase in East-West politics and a renewal of detente policy. So long as militarization continues to dominate political thinking, Europe's weakness will go on or even increase. The intellectual and cultural weight of Europe can only come to fruition "when the global arms madness no longer plays a politically decisive part." The world does not expect from the summit meeting between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev that "they become close friends." It is expected, however, "that they end the threat of a world conflict that will destroy everything."

CSO: 5200/2766

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRG DEFENSE MINISTER DEMANDS EUROPEAN DEFENSE INITIATIVE

DW051025 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 5 Sep 85 p 1

[Report signed SZA: "Woerner Wants European Defense Initiative"]

[Text] Bonn -- Defense Minister Woerner (CDU) for the first time publicly supported a European Defense Initiative (EVI) to ward off short-range and cruise missiles. The Europeans are forced to try to achieve such protection by themselves, "completely independent from and without regard for the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI]," said Woerner.

Woerner said in a SUEDDEUTSCHER RUNDFUNK interview that he could imagine that Bonn would take such an initiative in Europe. Discussing his recent Washington talks on SDI, he said that it becomes clearer and clearer to him that European research efforts on its own would be "very sensible." However, Bonn cannot take part in EVI studies with "great financial contributions," he noted, adding that this is "absolutely illusory." As for the SDI, "German financial contributions are neither demanded nor available," Woerner stated. What is involved is industrial participation. In order to consider possibilities to support industrial cooperation through a government agreement, a delegation of government and industrial experts, headed by the chancellor's adviser Horst Teltschik, flew on Wednesday to Washington.

CSO: 5200/2767

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

ITALY'S SPADOLINI VIEWS PARTICIPATION IN SDI RESEARCH

AU291548 Rome ANSA in English 1540 GMT 29 Aug 85

[Text] (ANSA) Milan, August 29 -- Italy's nod [as received] to the U.S. space shield is inseparable from that of Europe's, Italian Defense Minister Giovanni Spadolini insisted in an interview appearing in today's GIORNALE of Milan.

Following his talks in Rome with the director of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative James Abrahamson, Spadolini said that the SDI was a giant research program and not an irreversible strategic and political decision. Experimentation for the research project would require from five to seven years and only at the end of these studies would it be possible to ascertain the applicability of the data to the creation of a shield against intercontinental ballistics missiles, the minister went on. It would be a mistake not to join in the research at this stage, in Spadolini's view.

Nevertheless, any eventual Italian participation in the SDI would first be agreed upon within the context of the European Economic Community and West Germany and Britain have already voiced favorable views in this regard, the defense minister said.

CSO: 5200/2763

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MILAN SUMMIT ON EUREKA, FRENCH PROPOSALS

Paris AFP SCIENCES in French 4 Jul 85 pp 8-13

[Text] Milan--The European Council, which met in Milan on 28 and 29 June, expressed its support for the French Eureka project aimed at creating a technological Europe as well as for the "constructive proposals" made by the Brussels European Commission with the same goals.

According to the final press release of the summit, it "wanted" the Eureka project to be open to "those countries outside the Community who have already indicated their desire to participate."

The release further states that France, in conjunction with the presidency of the EEC and the Commission, is following up by convening an ad hoc committee before 14 July to discuss European technology. This committee should include the ministers responsible for research and other qualified representatives of the governments who support this initiative, as well as Commission representatives.

The release goes on to state that the European Council considers that these activities must "take advantage of the European dimension" to:

--"establish a close relationship between technological development and the effort to unify the internal market, for example by using practical measures of encouragement such as the "Eurotype" proposal (common standards for technological products),

--assure coordination between the technological effort and common policies, particularly trade policy towards principal [trade] partners,

--reduce the risks of needless duplication of effort on national levels and assemble a critical mass of financial and human resources,

--take full advantage of technical and financial instruments of the Community, including the instruments of the BEI [European Investment Bank], which are immediately available."

## French Proposals for the Eureka Program

At the Milan summit, France proposed contents for the Eureka program: 5 priority activities have been defined in the context of the document entitled "The Technological Renaissance of Europe." In the introduction to this document, Roland Dumas, minister of Foreign Affairs, and Hubert Curien, minister of Research and Technology, detailed the French concept of this ambitious project:

"Faced with the considerable efforts deployed by the United States and Japan, if Europe intends to respond to the technological challenges of the end of this century, it must quickly master the expertise that, tomorrow, will be at the heart of the third industrial revolution. We must choose quickly among the options that will lead to decadence or to the technological renaissance of Europe.

"We already know where our principal effort must be made. In fact, information technologies, production technologies and the technologies of plant and natural resources constitute the core of knowledge and talents that will open the doors of the third millennium for us.

"These technologies form a coherent whole, an original structure whose components are the computer and software, robots and "flexible" workshops, lasers and new materials, communications and transportation and, finally, the biotechnologies.

"Our future hangs on consolidating and reinforcing this knowledge and expertise. They will affect our ability to innovate work conditions, to renew relationships among people, to revamp training, health, leisure activities. Finally, only mastery of these technologies will assure our autonomy of decision and our independence.

"That is why European energies and know-how must be mobilized for precise objectives and programs with clear purposes. Five areas are decisive: computer science, telecommunications, robotics, materials and the biotechnologies. Together we must explore the frontiers of these fields of knowledge and master their concrete applications.

"The technological renaissance of Europe first requires mastery of the technologies of information, production and plant and natural resources.

"The information technologies applicable in a multitude of areas through components and software will open the way for progress that will affect all the other areas of activity.

"The components will be the "primary tools" in the allocation of human inventiveness that will transform them into various products and multiple services. Artificial intelligence and expert systems will mobilize knowledge and, ultimately, facilitate access to it. We must analyze better and understand better in order to transmit better and communicate better. Finally, super computers will help us to manage organizations better and to predict the evolution of natural systems better, from weather to social security.

"Tomorrow, the future of our societies will largely depend on communication among people. Here, technology is full of great promises: voice, data, image transmission, university without walls and remote work stations. These are innovation of all kinds that will be made possible by broad range of means of communication.

"Next, the production technologies, in the form of automated and flexible factories, will constitute the basis of new industrial structures. As instruments of negotiation among social groups, they will be the source of a true industrial renaissance. As for robots, because of their mobility, they will open up access to hostile worlds: ocean floors, high pressures, extreme cold, space. Moreover, they will free us from dangerous and health threatening work.

## EUREKA

### 5 PRIORITY ACTIVITIES FINALIZED

EUROMATIQUE

LARGE COMPUTERS

PARALLEL ARCHITECTURES

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND EXPERT SYSTEMS

FAST SILICON

AsGa GALLIUM ARSENIDE

EUROBOT

THIRD GENERATION ROBOTICS

AUTOMATED FACTORY / CADCAM

LASERS

EUROCOM

RESEARCH NETWORK

EQUIPMENT FOR BROAD BAND NETWORK

EUROBIO

ARTIFICIAL SEED

BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING

EUROMAT

CERAMIZED TURBINE

Finally, mastery of the technologies of plant and natural resources is crucial because our food, our health, revitalization of areas that are deserts today, depend on improved control and use of them. Biotechnologies offer us solutions to develop and enrich our agricultural resources. Artificial seeding marks the dawn of a new agricultural era.

#### Information Technology

- 1) Build large capacity computers.
- 2) Create tools to design and develop artificial intelligence and expert systems.
- 3) Develop artificial organs that will provide our automatic systems with sight, hearing, touch.

#### Communications Program:

- 1) Establish an optical communication network to carry voice, data and images at a low cost.
- 2) Allow research centers to communicate via suitable networks and allow future machines to communicate using quick switching.
- 3) Master the electronic image because of its cultural, as well as its economic impact.

#### Robotics Program:

- 1) Design a complete automated factory and, thereby, establish a communication network among robots.
- 2) Develop laser and particle flux machining and assembly.
- 3) Master miniaturized and mobile robots to work under very severe environmental conditions (underwater robots or a robot to operate during natural catastrophes.)
- 4) Develop and concentrate all of the optronic, new materials, energy, communications know-how in mobile robots and automated factories.

#### Program for Plant and Natural Resources

- 1) Achieve artificial seeding adapted to land and climate conditions.
- 2) Improve processing conditions for food resources.
- 3) Access ocean resources.
- 4) Fight desertification.

(...)

"In the past we Europeans were able to master space and energy problems. Our particle accelerators, our fusion machines, breeders, our planes, our space launchers, our satellites prove that we have covered a considerable part of the ground. Now we must work together on the key technologies of data processing production and natural resources.

"Five programs give form to our determination to act: EUROMATIQUE, EUROBOT, EUROCOP, EUROBIO, EUROMAT," the two French ministers further state in their introduction.

#### Eureka: Assembling the European Mosaic

Roland Dumas, the French minister of Foreign Affairs, announced on 28 June in Milan that "technology discussions" convening two ministers from each of 16 European nations interested in the "Eureka" project would be held in Paris "before 14 July" for the purpose of studying methods of financing specific programs.

The minister said that the ten nations of the EEC, Spain and Portugal, as well as Austria, Switzerland, Norway and Sweden, will form the ad hoc committee on Eureka that will meet for the first time at these discussions. The president of the European Commission and the commissioner in charge of technology will also participate, he said.

During the work of the European Council, Dumas indicated, the ten [EEC nations] also agreed to study the possibility of "using the services of the European Investment bank (BEI)" to finance the technology programs under Eureka.

The ten also accepted a proposal made by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to create a new European technological standard, that could be named "Eurotypes" or "Eurekatypes", "thus marking the technological progress of Europe on world markets," Dumas added.

Immediately after the summit, the comments at Milan were also accompanied by additional comments in various capitals.

FRG: "The European Eureka research project for civilian purposes and the participation of Europeans in the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) are not incompatible," said West German minister of Research Heinz Riesenhuber on 29 June.

"At most, conflicts could arise between the nations and private companies on the subject of financing various projects in the two programs." According to Riesenhuber, "the possible appearance of such conflicts depends on the manner in which cooperation within the SDI is organized."

In this context, the minister commented that Eureka had not yet been funded in the 1986 proposed West German budget. France, which originated the Eureka project, has not to date allocated funding for its initiative, noted Riesenhuber.

**SWEDEN:** After a two-day information mission to the Swedish capital by two representatives of the French government, it was also learned on 29 June in Stockholm from an authorized source that the Swedish cabinet is "very interested" in the project for technological cooperation in Europe.

9969  
CSO: 3698/582

## BELGIUM'S SCIENCE MINISTER ON EUREKA, SDI PROSPECTS

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 17 Jul 85 pp 21-25

[Article by Frank De Moor: "Eureka And Europe Are First With Us."]

[Text] On 17 July the European Foreign Ministers and the Science Policy Ministers are meeting in Paris with some of their colleagues from non-EC member states and with Commission Chairman Jacques Delors jointly to give more form to Eureka, the European Research Coordination Agency-plan. The second part of the conversation which took place last week with Minister of Budget, Science Policy, and the Plan, Philippe Maystadt (PSC), was about this matter.

Before the end of this month, the Belgian Government will need a number of reports to get a better picture of what Belgian participation in Eureka means, on the one hand, and the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), on the other. As is known, early this year a number of ministers like Prime Minister Wilfried Martens and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Leo Tindemans (CVP) and Freddy Vreven (PVV) were openly enthusiastic about SDI, before any government deliberations had taken place, let alone a thorough study on the matter.

At the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) on 27 March in Luxemburg, Defense Minister Vreven went so far as to commit himself formally to participation in SDI, while Economics Minister Mark Eyskens (CVP) at the end of April waved a list of firms which, after study, doesn't look the least bit like the SDI listing which the Union of Belgian Enterprises (VBO) and the Department of Science Planning will propose officially one of these days. They will do that within the Working Group set up by the government on 17 March under the leadership of Ambassador Frans Baekelandt, currently ambassador to The Hague but in a few weeks scheduled to be named Director General for Policy at the Foreign Ministry in Brussels or directly involved in policy formulation. This Working Group must have a first draft ready for Prime Minister Martens by the end of this month.

Meanwhile, the Working Group within the West European Union (WEU) in London which deals with strategic questions connected with SDI must also have its interim report ready at that time. That group is chaired by WEU Secretary General Alfred Cahen who, until a short time ago, was Director General for Policy at the Foreign Ministry. As was discussed here more fully on 23 July,

and as Minister Maystadt also notes in this interview, the WEU Working Group led by Secretary General Cahen apparently has taken over from the Baekelandt Working Group the study of the geo-strategic implications of a possible SDI participation, while the Baekelandt Working Group deals exclusively with how to arrange research, technology, and patent transfers within the framework of possible Belgian cooperation in SDI (by means of a bilateral treaty?)

It is precisely for this reason that a delegation of the Baekelandt Working Group went to Washington at the beginning of this month. During that trip it appeared that the SDI office (SDIO) under the command of Lieutenant General James Abrahamson wanted to reach immediate bilateral arrangements particularly with firms or research centers, without entering into bilateral governmental agreements having a basically political nature. Lieutenant General Abrahamson and the American Pentagon clearly want to avoid getting stuck in administrative meandering. The General seems to be especially afraid of what he calls "getting bogged down in bureaucracy." It will not escape anyone that bureaucracy in this context is partly synonymous with democracy.

#### Time Lag

In the meantime, the proponents of the Eureka plan have in their turn made progress. As is well known, the Eureka plan was launched in mid-April by the French Government precisely in response to the technological challenge posed by SDI within Europe. For that reason the European Ministers of Science Policy convened in Rome on 4 June, and will do so again on 17 July. Therefore, the question put to Minister of Budget, Science Policy, and the Plan, Phillippe Maystadt (PSC), is: how far has Eureka come?

--Philippe Maystadt: At that time no decisions were made in Rome, but we did have informal talks there, which in the meantime have been continued in Luxemburg. The meeting of state and government leaders in Milan on 28 and 29 June has only taken us half way. I had hoped that, there at least, some concrete projects would be launched, but no. That will have to happen on 17 July. The more so, since among the Ministers of Science Policy there is a definite consensus growing in certain fields. To start with, everyone acknowledges that no member state by itself should try to catch up in a good number of fields where we are behind as compared with the United States and Japan. For this reason a consensus has definitely grown to tackle the information technologies together. It could become a program like Esprit (European Strategic Program of Research and Development in Information Technology), but then with concrete applications where artificial intelligence, super computers, computerized production and such are concerned.

As far as new material go, I think that a consensus is growing to develop jointly super conductors, lasers and the optics connected with that. Indeed, that was already forcefully pressed for in the original French Eureka proposal of mid-April. In Rome, as a matter of fact, the French and the Germans already asked themselves whether or not there should be a super laser and what kind of strength it should have. The Germans wanted it to be a bit more powerful than the French.

One can look at getting Eureka started from two different angles. Either we throw ourselves from the start into certain technologies, or we define first of all certain fields within which technological applications can be developed. That choice has not yet been made clear. The one, of course, does not exclude the other. In this way, we can immediately seize upon certain technologies, because we are convinced that Europe must master them; and we can not, for example, leave the Americans with a monopoly over powerful lasers.

Meanwhile, we can fund and direct more attention to certain scientific fields, such as oceanography. Because the Americans want to construct a defense shield in space does not mean that we should no longer be interested in the riches of the ocean. Viewing the scientific capacities which Belgium possesses in that field, we all have an interest in supporting the proposal made by my Danish Science Policy colleague and let it grow into a European initiative.

At first the French wanted to define only some ten technologies to trigger Eureka. Those were, as is now well known, optronics, new materials, powerful lasers, super speed computers, artificial intelligence, and accelerated Esprit program. In the meantime, biotechnology and computerized factories (FMS: Flexible Manufacturing Systems), equipped with robots having certain senses were added. Either we develop these technologies, or we tackle certain fields such as a new generation of transport and exploration into the uses of space. We must urgently decide on certain projects which by their nature will mobilize enough people and funding.

#### Disillusionment

In the meantime, as Minister of Science Policy, you are also involved with the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Using the Baekelandt Working Group and the Union of Belgian Enterprises (VBO) you are looking into the question of which firms in our country can participate in work on SDI. Do you think that a firm's participation in SDI would exclude it from participating in Eureka, or vice versa?

--Maystadt: The problems are different. With Eureka we would have no difficulty setting up something in a European context. There are no initial political or strategic implications involved. On the other hand, the American Strategic Defense Initiative raises some very important questions with regard to the defense of Europe and more such issues. As long as those questions are not answered, the government can certainly not give its official support to SDI. That would not prevent certain Belgian firms and university research centers from concluding contracts with Americans involved with SDI. No one can prohibit that.

--A university center uses government funds, doesn't it; and precisely for that reason doesn't the government have the right to prohibit participation in SDI?

--Maystadt: No, because they would not be using government funds in this case. On the contrary. The Americans are prepared to pay for everything. For some Belgian research centers, which are receiving less and less funding, this opportunity does not fall on deaf ears. The fact that certain university centers for that reason do accept projects does not mean that Belgium, as such, supports SDI.

--But it appears that the study of crucial questions and answers that must help define the Belgian point of view is drowning in the multinational Working Group of the West European Union (WEU) in London, while from the very beginning the government on 17 May gave to the Baekelandt Working Group the task of carrying out such a study in Brussels.

--Maystadt: Indeed, I am also surprised by the way things are going. The instructions that the government gave to Ambassador Baekelandt and his group, directed him to contribute to a coordinated response to a 26 March letter from American Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. That response was also supposed to reflect strategic and diplomatic aspects. Now it looks as if the Baekelandt Working Group is limiting itself to purely technical details and that Defense Secretary Weinberger's letter is being interpreted all too narrowly. We are unable to answer his question about joining the SDI research program without first discussing the strategic implications of SDI.

--The VBO is clearly less optimistic than some diplomats about the possible participation by Belgian firms in SDI. As was explained here more extensively already on 3 July, Belgium should be satisfied if one or two firms are able to participate in SDI.

--Maystadt: That disillusionment seems to be just as great in other countries. Similarly, the enthusiasm of German industrialists has also cooled, whereas at first they were ardent proponents of SDI. As I have always said, it is becoming only too clear that the Americans only seek from us that which they lack themselves. It is, therefore, an illusion to think that SDI for us is the dreamed of opportunity for catching up with the U.S. in certain fields where we are behind. The Americans won't pay us for that anyway, will they?

--What do we have to offer them?

--Maystadt: In starting Eureka we circulated a letter to some 2,000 firms based on a list of services for Science Policy. We asked them for the fields in which they are interested. Up to now we have received some 400 answers, and from a first sampling it appears that half of them definitely want to participate in Eureka and have already pointed out certain well-defined fields. Thus, there appears to be a very specific interest in expert-systems, and in a joint European approach to the development thereof.

The same is true for new materials, and there again, certain firms are very precise when it comes to new kinds of resins or ceramics. If from this inquiry a number of fields are derived around which a consensus can be built, we will contact those firms again to request an even more detailed reply.

More Funds

--Should these same firms be interested in both Eureka and SDI, is there perhaps still a possibility for a joint approach?

--Maystadt: Before there can be talk of any official Belgian support for SDI a number of obstacles still have to be removed and that by far has not yet happened. SDI raises enormous questions about Europe's place in the geo-strategy of tomorrow. It makes no sense to evade these questions in order to permit participation now by a few firms in SDI and to support them in that officially. This purely commercial reflex doesn't counterbalance the issue of how our continent in the coming century will organize its defense. Added to this is the fact that participation in European programs like Eureka costs a lot of money, and that we cannot at the same time finance both European and American projects. Having said this, there will certainly be firms participating in Eureka as well as in SDI. Our budget is proportionately the least significant in Europe, and I think that these scarce funds must be spent on European projects first. Two years ago I did indeed introduce a separate provision for the Science Policy budget to finance participation in European projects. Well, by virtue of this provision, more capital will have to be allotted for Eureka. Should this become a genuinely joint project, as we hope it will, Eureka will be financed in the first instance by the European Community itself. Belgium will then already participate in it because of its contribution to the Community. Because Eureka will most likely become a European plan a geometrie variable, not all European member states will be obliged to participate in all programs and thus additional funding will have to be worked out.

--Is that where the idea comes from to establish an umbrella coordinating bureau with which the name of Viscount Etienne Davignon has been mentioned, or has it not?

--Maystadt: His name is indeed being mentioned by circles involved.

CSO: 5200/2733

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

DAVIGNON, TINDEMANS COMMENT ON EUREKA PROGRAM

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 17 Jul 85 pp 1, 2

[Interviews with Etienne Davignon and Leo Tindemans, Minister of Foreign Relations, by Michel Theys: "Will Technological Europe Be Created in Paris?"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Mr Tindemans is of the opinion that the French "Eureka" project must be developed within the context of the Community. Mr Davignon argues that more freedom should be left to private initiative.

The "conference" on technological Europe is taking place these 17-18 July in Paris, and it is attended by the 12 Community members and Austrian, Swiss, Norwegian and Swedish representatives. But Belgium has every intention of turning this "conference" into a mere "symposium": as Mr Tindemans explained, these "smaller" countries will not allow the development of the French "Eureka" initiative to take place anywhere but in the context of the Community. They have every intention of saying "no" to the inter-government cooperation advocated by President Mitterrand.

For his part, Etienne Davignon, an expert on this question, is trying to bridge the gap between the two approaches.

[Question] The Europeans now seem to have agreed to recognize the need for increased cooperation in the fields of technology and industrialization. Is this new awareness to be credited to the Americans, together with the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI)?

[E. D.] The trend had started before that, during the past two or three years, not as a reaction, but for purely European reasons.

The Europeans became aware that three conditions had to be met if they were to have the same chances as in the United States or Japan. The first condition was to accept politically the need to define a strategic vision and to take the consequences of the choices thus made. This evolution took place little by little. The clearest sign of this political determination was the approval of the "ESPRIT" program [European Strategic Program for R&D in Infor-

mation Technology] at a time when intra-community relations were at an all-time low: the European Council meeting in Athens had just failed; the English had not ruled out using the community agricultural policy as a hostage to increase their pressure on their partners; the Germans were demanding budget discipline... It was in this execrable political context, and at a time when negotiations on community financing had reached a deadlock that the Ten decided to allocate large additional amounts to the ESPRIT program, because they had finally been convinced that this was so important that they could not oppose it. Since then, their awareness has kept increasing.

#### Salami

On the other hand, the Ten had to realize that they could not keep slicing the salami without acknowledging that it was indeed a salami. In other words, that it is impossible to achieve a technological development comparable to that of the United States or Japan without checking whether or not all the elements that enable them to enjoy the situation which is now theirs also exist in our countries. Now, long before the U.S. initiative, it was an accepted idea that the Community had to play an important part in creating the environment required, the "major market", European standards, etc.

Finally, the operators, the manufacturers, had to recognize that they needed it and could not just benefit from it. For if you need something, you will have to accept taking responsibilities. This evolution, too, had taken place before the SDI took off.

#### Developer

It is true that the "Strategic Defense Initiative" worked as a developer since it disclosed what a large country can do when, for reasons of its own, it considers that it is essential to accelerate technological development. The United States just did again with the SDI what they had done under President Kennedy to meet the Soviet challenge, when they decided that the first man to walk on the moon would be an American.

This initiative reminded public opinion that, when Washington deems something important, it can achieve a consensus and find the necessary financial resources. But another factor also became apparent: namely that the United States did not intend this program to be anything but exclusively American, contrary to the collaboration that was established, for instance, in the space sector. For these programs, there is a distribution of tasks, responsibilities and financial consequences.

In the case of the SDI, European companies that are interested will participate in a U.S. program: they will not be expected to pay and, as a result, they will not share in the responsibilities and therefore will not benefit from any of the spin-offs. Thus, even though such a collaboration may be of interest for a number of companies or researchers, the operation can obviously not become part of a European strategic program...

[Question] But you said yourself that the Americans will find a consensus when they launch a program of such a scope as the SDI. Then, how can you prevent European companies approached by Washington from being tempted? How are you going to make the Eureka program of the "Technological Community" credible when London, for instance, refuses to allocate any public funds to them?

[Answer] Nobody's position can be considered to be final until we know how Eureka--which until now is only the expression of a need, not a program--will materialize.

#### Spin-Offs

Under these conditions, the SDI will obviously be of limited interest to European companies. Who will own the results of research? To what extent will a European company be allowed to use them for its own benefit when it is not the program "leader"? These are essential questions and we should therefore realize that spin-offs for European companies will naturally be limited. As a result, I do not believe at all that the SDI could limit the potential of Eureka: the contrary is more likely.

[Question] The major difference between the U.S. initiative and the European plans is that the former is a pure-research program whereas Europe, on the contrary, is trying to have pure research materialize at industrial level?

[Answer] The first difference is that the U.S. program is essentially military, and civilian only incidentally. The objective is not to find out what you can do with a laser, but to design a targeted laser around terms of reference whose goal it is to implement a defense system. Which does not mean that there will be no civilian spin-offs.

In addition, the goals of Eureka and of the Commission's proposals go beyond the mere definition of a given technology: the goal of these programs is that Europe should retain expertise of the technologies that will condition the future. It is therefore also a strategic concept, but one very different from that which prevails in the United States. In addition, these programs are not limited to space applications. And finally, they also concern the conditions under which these technologies can be developed: changes in the European market are necessary if the ground is to become as fertile as in the United States or in Japan.

[Question] Is not that just the reason that we should remain in the community context rather than considering a mere inter-government cooperation?

[Answer] Opposing the community and inter-government approaches would amount to negating the experiment carried out during the past few years. Actually, two essential factors must be present.

#### Objectivity

The first is that this program must have a strategic objective, i.e. priorities. What is the best context to define priorities in Europe? The Community

through its Commission, because it is more objective. It has more information at its disposal and, above all, it does not have "a white elephant to sell": it does not have any program that would have started at national level but that would be too expensive, etc. It does not have any, especially since the situation of its own instruments--the JET [Joint European Torus], Ispra....--has been thoroughly clarified with the Council.

The Commission, therefore, is rather well equipped to become the independent and disinterested authority that will define and explain priorities, what is good for Europe. All the more so as its latest experiments--ESPRIT, RACE [R&D in Advanced Communication Technology for Europe], BRITE [Basic Research on Industrial Technology for Europe]--show that it is quite competent to do so and that it has good contacts with manufacturers and scientists.

[Question] How then do you explain the reluctance of countries like France or Germany?

[Answer] Because, at the same time, they must also answer other questions. For instance, to do something, must we always be 12? This brings us back to the old problem of decision making.

Snow

Let's take an example that is not as far-fetched as it would seem. To develop an essential technology, you have to use snow. But, in several Community countries, it never snows. These countries will tell you: "We agree to this program on snow. It is a huge sacrifice for us because we do not have any snow. Therefore, to make up for it, we want a program on hail because we get quite a lot of hail in our parts." Too bad if hail does not meet any of the specifications of snow and therefore cannot be the subject of a strategic program... This is a real difficulty in Europe: I mean that some will get a compensation for something that does not require any.

[Question] Apart from this, the approach adopted by the Commission in its proposals is rather revolutionary in that it provides a possibility not to force all member states to participate. It even mentions independent "agencies" that would fit into the community context...

[Answer] This is why there should not be any quarrels among schools. All that we need is a joint decision that, on the one hand, our strategic approach and the measures that we should implement to achieve the conditions of development should be at community level and that, on the other hand, implementation should depend on what each of us will bring. Acting this way would be logical and consistent if we shift from the concept of overall community cooperation to that of implementation of specific projects that can be implemented only by those who have something to contribute in that field.

Proration

The theory of "just return" is absurd when we want to create basic conditions that will benefit all of us, but in specific cases it is legitimate that someone making a 40-percent contribution should exert a 40-percent influence. This

is what is done with Airbus and Ariane, and it works. The influence and the spin-offs must reflect the risks taken, the contribution made.

This problem will be solved progressively, when we start negotiating on material points. And we must allow the concrete domain to develop on its own, otherwise manufacturers and scientists will be excessively protected against the risks they must take. In a way, this danger is inherent to any bureaucratic system, whether national or at community level, in that by trying to be perfect it may generate an imbalance between those who take a risk and those who supervise.

In conclusion, the Community is the group best qualified to identify priorities. As far as implementation is concerned, considering that it cannot be financed by the Community in the immediate future and that participations will essentially be national--which is important since they will not involve just demands: there will also have to be contributions--we must agree on the simplest formula.

There should be no confusion: there is room enough for a multiplicity of procedures that will depend on the tasks that must be accomplished. If universities are interested in a project, they will have to agree among themselves; for cooperation among several manufacturers, it will be up to them to agree on a contract... Thus, there will be many interested parties and I do not see why the Community should get involved in everything. There is not need to take responsibilities when it is not indispensable.

[Question] Therefore, you do not agree with smaller countries which fear that this trend could lead to a sort of technological uncoupling between "larger" and "smaller" countries within the Community?

[Answer] Not as long as priorities are identified at community level, as long as access to a minimum of knowledge is provided through the Community's basic scientific programs. Not as long as specific problems [as published] are set up in the same spirit as the few programs that already exist.

#### Remuneration

Belgium is not unhappy with its participation in the European Space Agency, but the contribution it agreed to make is greater than what it would have been based on the community distribution key. As a counterpart, it also gets more out of it.

The combination of the two approaches is a guarantee. The former provides access to scientific programs and makes it possible to benefit from their spin-offs. As for the manner in which what is thus gained is to be used for future programs, considering that financing is not easy to find, no one will refuse to let a partner acquire an interest.

If the whole structure was an inter-government structure, however, there would be some danger. Not due to hostility, but quite simply because it would be very difficult to alter the compromise agreements already signed by the two

or three "larger" countries which would fear that such alterations might affect the equilibrium they had reached. This combination, therefore, should give good results. It makes sure that community action will be given priority. It also makes sure that the Community will be informed of anything that is going on, even if it has no part of the action. And all will be able to contribute as long as they have something to contribute--otherwise we would again have the system of political compensations.

#### Equilibrium

If some countries are reluctant to contribute to an effort that would be just a community effort, it is because they feel that the Commission can hardly reject the blame for not taking everybody's interests sufficiently into account. It was hoped that the ESPRIT project would be managed according to the principle of "just return," i.e. that the States would have had the last word. But if they had had the last word, they would have put intense pressure on the Commission's departments and, to go around the obstacles thus created, it would have been necessary to buy their agreement by creating programs diversified enough to get the green light from everybody.

Clearly, equilibrium lies between the two. The Commission is aware that its effort cannot continue unless it generates an overall added value. On the other hand, the commission itself must determine what this overall added value will be, and no blackmail can be tolerated. And if, within the scope of a strategic objective, it deems it necessary to acquire expertise in a given technology, it is too bad if the condition is met only in a single European location: it will have to be done there. The ambiguity is that some States fear that the Commission may not be able to resist pressures from a majority of countries that would not make up a majority contribution.

[Question] Will all this be clarified after the Paris meeting?

[Answer] The process will be somewhat slower, for it is a complex matter. Priorities cannot be the addition of what each of us wants: rather accurate checks will be required. Especially since we will also have to investigate the expressions of interest coming from countries that do not belong to the Community.

The outcome of the Paris meeting, therefore, should be the political confirmation of the States' determination to commit themselves. Rather than following the Commission, they would then become part of the maneuvers. That is important.

Mr Tindemans: "The Commission's Card"

[Question] Belgium is going to the Paris meeting with leaden soles, at least it is dragging its feet?

[L. T.] At the meeting of the West European Union, last April in Bonn, Belgium declared itself in favor of the creation of a "Technological Community" within the European Communities. When the French pointed out that the formula did not matter, that the operation could also be made in the form of an agency,

a club of the "Airbus" type or a Community, several of us argued that the community context should be retained. For smaller European countries, the guarantees offered by the European treaty and institutions are essential in the technological field...

[Question] Otherwise, in your opinion, the Europe of technology would become the preserve of companies from larger States?

[Answer] Maybe not, but the matter is more fundamental: if we agree that it is no longer possible to have recourse to the Community formula to expand the activities of the Community, this means that, intentionally or not and maybe without saying so, we are terminating the European structure. It means that the Community can go on vegetating but that we are looking for other formulas whenever we want to innovate, take new steps. That would be the death of European construction!

[Question] Then, how do you explain that, at the European Council meeting in Milan, France joined six other countries to demand more integration and that at the same time it defended that idea of inter-government cooperation? Are the two compatible?

[Answer] The French position remains confused. In Milan too, Belgium and other countries pleaded for a Community of technology. As a result, the Ten agreed on a formula that provides for the creation of a ministerial committee to see how the "Eureka" initiative and the Commission's proposal can be coupled. This is the point of view that Belgium will represent in Paris.

[Question] But France convened a "conference" of technological Europe, not a preliminary meeting...

[Answer] We should not forget that some countries that do not belong to the Community are also invited, and that France made contacts with them. As far as I am concerned, I cannot yet clearly discern the true intentions of the French. I do not know what is going to happen in Paris, what will be put on the table, and what part could be offered to Belgium. What is certain, is that the Belgian government intends to play the Commission's card: this is the only way for us to be sure to benefit from all the results and to make sure that "smaller" countries are not neglected or merely asked to play the part of subcontractors at European level.

[Question] Is it the right time for an institutional quarrel? Is it not essential to ensure that companies start to collaborate to meet a technological challenge that will condition the future?

[Answer] Yes, but only as long as everybody acts with good will and in a community spirit. Should we agree to be excluded from a given sector in the future without being able to protest effectively? The formula, therefore, is not a negligible matter...

9294  
CSO: 3698/649

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOST AUSTRIANS TAKE WAIT-AND-SEE POSITION ON EUREKA

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 12 Jul 85 p 9

[Article by Hedi Cech: "Is Technological Integration Preordained? Austrian Firms Take Wait-and-See Position on Eureka"]

[Text] In a flash--in complete contrast to its normal practice--the federal government reacted: only a few days after the new European high technology program Eureka was launched at the EEC summit in Milan at the end of June and Austria was invited to participate in the cooperation, the Ministry for Science and Research began exploratory discussions with management and labor, legislatures, and research support sources to work out the possibility of Eureka cooperation. The goal of the hectic activity: to be able to present a well-thought-out position paper with a list of companies and research facilities at the ad-hoc conference on Eureka called for 17 and 18 July in Paris so that Austria's interests are represented as well as possible in France. For, at this meeting, not only the research ministers and foreign ministers of the 10-member community, but also representatives of the two future EEC states, Spain and Portugal, as well as Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and Norway will sit at the negotiating table and discuss the scope as well as issues of the structure and financing of the Eureka program.

So, while our political leaders (Minister for Foreign Affairs Leopold Gratz: "Eureka is of the utmost importance for the future of our country"; Minister for Science and Research Heinz Fischer: "We must not miss out on the third industrial revolution") already see the small Alpen republic as a technological paradise, Austria's businesses are not quite so optimistic. The "We are basically in favor of participation in international high-tech programs" is followed in most cases by a "but." For the time being, they would like to wait and see what approach will be adopted in Paris and what concept the Austrian government produces after that. But, there are also concerns that the countries will not be able to agree on feasible critical programs; and, not insignificantly, many ask whether the "admission price"--that is the investment--will be amortized for the companies in the foreseeable future. For, in the long run, participation in Eureka--political leaders and industry agree on this--will not only open up the possibility to get in on foreign know-how and to jump on the fast-moving technology express, but above all will bring real production orders and currency.

Eureka (European Research Coordination Agency, with the letter "k" as an accommodation to the FRG, which has a Eureca platform in its space program) is--as DIE PRESSE reported--a French initiative. The members of the EEC are to set up with the participation of non-EEC countries an "a la carte" high technology research program, which would represent a counterbalance to the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) of the United States--but in the non-military domain. Three major research areas are planned:

- Information technologies (microprocessors, artificial intelligence, telecommunications);
- Production technologies (supercomputers, computer-integrated production);
- Biotechnology.

The goal of the joint efforts should be, according to the French conception, to catch up with the United States and Japan, if not to exceed them, within 10 to 20 years, in the research and development area as well as in economic competitiveness through a concentration of the intellectual and business potential present in Europe.

#### To Invest Specifically in Promising Projects

The structure the Eureka program will have is as yet undetermined. One variant might be a form like that of COST [European Cooperation of Scientific and Technical Research], a European research cooperative already in existence for over 10 years, in which Austria is also participating with good results. COST distinguishes itself especially through its flexibility and nonbureaucratic structure and fulfills the wishes of the "small" member countries. "Independent of the scope of the research expenditures financed by the individual partners," according to Heinz Schreiber of the Research Section of the Ministry of Science, "each COST partner has a right to the totality of the results obtained." On the other hand, the inclusion of the Eureka program in the EEC commission is being discussed, where Austria--as well as the other countries--would be required to contribute a fixed amount based on a certain distribution formula. Austria is understandably pushing for the COST variant, "since, in this case, we would not only be partners with equal rights, we could also invest the funds available to us quite specifically in those projects which seemed promising to us," says Science Minister Fischer.

Here he touches on a subject of importance to businesses: Financial resources available to domestic firms wishing to enter or already participating in the high tech area are not unlimited. Therefore at the Vereinigten Edelstahlwerken [United High-Grade Steel Works] (VEW) they have decided for the time being against participation in Eureka. Hans Martin Gogela, coordinator for chairman Friedrich Schmollgruber, lists the reasons: With the structural plan 2000 they have already worked out their evolution as a quality oriented technological firm; the product plan (for example, new materials for gas and steam turbines and for coal liquefaction as well as powder metallurgy) does not coincide with the Eureka emphases. They will however continue to participate in COST projects.

The research manager for Elin, Herbert Birkner, also is very skeptical for the time being. His reservations, however, rather concern the fact that Eureka will become a "political end in itself" and too many programs will lose sight of the true goal--that is, integration into the international research level. Elin has nothing against research; for COST they worked in the superconductivity sector and had favorable experiences.

VOEST is currently holding back from participation in the new technology program. The large firm, according to press spokesman Franz Summer, wants to wait and find out what happens in Paris. And then it also depends on what the Austrian government decides to do--only when that is clear will they consider participation.

No matter how this plan of attack finally looks--at the Austrian leading-edge technology firm of Plansee, chairman Rudolf Machenschalk is hoping for a quick decision. "Since we never deliver finished products, but only highly specialized individual components, it is especially important for us to learn about actual projects where we can participate." Financially, Machenschalk sees few problems: "In order not to be left out of the union, one must also be prepared to take some investment risks."

Sports equipment manufacturer Fischer is prepared to invest, but only within the planned limits of the research budget (they did not wish to cite actual figures). The Upper Austrian firm, which in recent years developed supporting poles for the Airbus among other things, can picture itself involved in Eureka cooperation in the field of space flight. Fischer also does not wish to undertake anything without official governmental guidelines.

The reaction of ITT Austria and Simmering-Graz-Pauker (SGP) was totally different. Their decisions to participate have already been made; the Ministry of Science has even been informed already. While ITT head of development Peter Knezu cannot cite any details yet ("We will surely get involved in the information technology sector"), Bruno Krainz, head of technical planning at SGP, can already designate three specific areas: robots linked to CAD/CAM (robots which can build themselves); processing of plastics which are exceptionally light and resistant to temperature variations; as well as aluminum processing. In return for their quick reaction SGP is also expecting a thing or two from the Eureka planners: the investment (Krainz states: "For this we will surely have to increase our 100 million schilling research budget") should pay off no later than 7 years after the beginning of work.

12666

CSO: 3698/633

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

JAPANESE EXPERTS HEADED TO U.S. FOR SDI DISCUSSIONS

OW061115 Tokyo MAINICHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 4 Aug 85 Morning Edition p 1

[Text] In relation to the questions regarding participation in America's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, the Japanese Government has decided to dispatch a group of experts to the United States late this month to learn how the program is progressing, so it can reach a conclusion on the participation issue and send a reply to U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger sometime in September. This was learned on 3 August from a government source.

The government's present position on the SDI is that, (as Prime Minister Nakasone has said) it "understands SDI research." But, as for the substance of the prospective reply, the same source said, "since the government has shown its understanding, it will have to cooperate in the existing framework." The issue will finally be decided by a highly political judgment of the prime minister. Nevertheless, chances are high that the government will go further from its present stance of "understanding" the SDI and say in its reply that it "will take part in research."

Participation in the SDI involves many problems concerning Japan's basic policies, such as the peaceful use of space, the three non-nuclear principles, and the three principles governing the export of arms. Therefore, in the extraordinary Diet session this fall, opposition parties are expected to raise strong opposition to Japan's participation in the SDI. So, this issue, along with the question of removing the 1-percent-of-the GNP ceiling on defense spending and that of whether or not the prime minister can visit the Yasukuni Shrine in his official capacity, is most likely to become a subject of heated debate.

U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger sent a letter to Foreign Minister Abe on 27 March this year asking for Japan's response to the SDI within 60 days. Subsequently, the United States withdrew the 60-day time limit. Japan has so far maintained a noncommittal stance toward the SDI issue because, before making any decision, it wanted to wait and see how West European countries would react and how the U.S.-Soviet disarmament negotiations would turn out. Therefore, attention has been focused on when Japan will reply to the U.S. request.

The Japanese Government has set September as the time for reply on the following considerations:

- 1) Japan cannot delay its reply to the Weinberger letter indefinitely; 2) the secretary is scheduled to visit Japan in October; 3) the convocation of the extraordinary Diet

session may be advanced to early October, and it is advisable to arrive at a conclusion before it; and 4) the foreign ministers of the seven summit nations will meet when the UN General Assembly session opens in late September, and Japan has to make a decision before this meeting with regard to the question of participation in the SDI.

As a preliminary step, the Japanese Government invited a (five-man) group of U.S. experts led by Yonas, acting deputy chief of the Pentagon's Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO), to Japan in late April to explain the technological aspects of the SDI, the present state of Soviet research related to its own SDI version, the SDI's political and strategic significance, the projected SDI cost, the relationship between the SDI and the antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty, and the areas of Japanese technology the United States is particularly interested in.

As the second step, the Japanese Government wanted to invite (Air Force) Lieutenant General Abrahamson, director of the SDIO, to Japan in order to receive a second round of briefing. But, because his schedule precludes his early visit to Japan, the Japanese Government has decided to dispatch its own experts to the United States. The group will consist of officials selected from the Foreign Ministry, the MITI, the Defense Agency, and the Science and Technology Agency.

To pave the way for participation in the SDI program, the Japanese Government has presented the following argument during Diet debates and at other forums: 1) Some part of the SDI involves nuclear weaponry, but it is possible for Japan to cooperate with the United States in non-nuclear areas; 2) scientists can be dispatched within the framework of the Japanese Constitution and national policies, and technical transfer is possible within the framework of the Japan-U.S. agreement on the transfer of military technology. Speaking to the 4 June session of the Lower House Cabinet Affairs Committee, Prime Minister Nakasone said in particular that the nature of the question regarding participation in SDI research is such that "it does not require a formal request for a Diet debate on it."

Thus he aired his view that no new treaty or agreement is needed even if a decision to participate is made. This view is based on the assumption that technical cooperation or transfer will pose no problem as long as it is done within the bounds of the January 1983 government decision on the transfer of military technology to the United States. The government is likely to handle the question of participation in SDI research within this framework.

COPYRIGHT: MAINICHI SHIMBUN 1985

CSO: 5260/13

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

BRIEFS

FRG'S SDI DELEGATION IN U.S.--Bonn/Washington, 4 Sep (DPA)--A high-ranking Federal Government delegation left for the United States today to spend 9 days being briefed on the possibilities of participating in the project for a space-based anti-missile defense system or Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI]. The delegation is led by Horst Teltschik, adviser on foreign affairs in the Federal Chancellor's Office. The 30 civil servants and industrialists will visit the leading centers of high technology in different parts of the United States. The details of the fact-finding tour, which was announced months ago, were not made known by the Federal Chancellor's Office. It was learned from informed sources, however, that the visit will begin with 2 days of talks in Washington, during which the problems of a possible commitment, first and foremost the protection of secrets and the rights of exploitation, will be dealt with. In viewing of the recent espionage cases, the competent government circles in Bonn are expecting extraordinarily difficult talks on the subject of the passing on the secret technological information. [Excerpt] [Hamburg DPA in German 0810 GMT 4 Sep 85 LD]

FRG GOVERNMENT GRANT TO EUREKA--Bonn, 3 Sep (DPA)--The Federal Government has provided a grant of approximately DM1 billion for the European research program Eureka. As confirmed today by informed sources, the possibility of incorporating appropriate commitment authorizations for the project, to be arranged in 1987, into the federal budget is currently being considered. Research Minister Heinz Riesenhuber (CDU), Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), and Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU), intend to speak about this in the next few days. Commitment authorizations mean that legally binding commitments can be entered into at the express of later budgets. According to reports, the plans are directed toward the incorporation into the federal budget of grants which altogether make up the sum of approximately DM1 billion spread over 3 to 4 years from 1987. This would provide the opportunity for organizing the annual sums differently according to the number of projects to be funded. French President Francois Mitterrand has already announced the provision of the equivalent of DM350 million for the initial phase of Eureka. Bonn's thoughts are taking place against the background of the second Eureka planning conference, scheduled for November, in Hannover, at the level of foreign and research ministers. It is expected that Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl will officially submit the grant, which is under consideration, at the opening of the conference. Resources on the order of DM20 million to DM50 million are available in the Research Ministry budget for the 1986 fiscal year.

However, it is made clear by the Research Ministry that only a fraction of the actual billion [as received] grant could be provided from the ministry's own budget in the coming years. The other, and probably larger part would have to be financed from the total federal budget. [Text] [Hamburg DPA in German 0854 GMT 3 Sep 85 LD]

CSO: 5200/2766

SALT/START ISSUES

USSR: LATE AUGUST COMMENTS, REPORTS ON MX PROGRAM

Implications for U.S.-Soviet Relations

LD231657 Moscow TASS in English 1617 GMT 23 Aug 85

[*"Contrary to the Demands of the Peoples"*--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 23 Aug (TASS)--Vladimir Chernyshov, TASS military news analyst, writes:

The Pentagon has officially announced its intention to hold the first test launching of an intercontinental ballistic missile MX from a silo launcher. The aim of this test is to speed up as much as possible the deployment of these new first nuclear strike missiles.

Official Washington is impatient. It feels that the huge nuclear arsenal accumulated by the United States, which includes already now nearly 26,000 nuclear munitions, is not enough. It neglects the calculations of U.S. experts indicating that the U.S.A. has fifty times as large a power as is necessary to ensure its security, albeit nobody has ever intended and does not intend now to attack the United States. It refuses point-blank to heed the voice of reason and is not frightened by the warnings made to it by realistically-minded Americans that the generations to come will regard this death-bringing arms race as a case of group madness. The question, which is permanently put to it all over the world is now the Washington rhetoric about the "constructive" stand of the U.S.A. at the talks on nuclear and space weapons and the seemingly "serious, businesslike" preparations for the Soviet-American summit meeting tally with the practical steps in the field of unprecedented arms race, which are loudly declared by it almost daily.

The MX missile, which can turn a territory of 42 square miles into a radioactive desert, is not the only example of that. Nuclear-powered missile carrying submarines of the Ohio type, sea-based Trident-1 and Trident-2 missiles, Midgetman ICBM's, B-1B and ATB (Stealth) bombers, Pershing-2 missiles, sea, air and land-based long-range cruise missiles make that enormous arsenal, which as the Washington figures believe, is necessary to ensure their military-strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. Moreover, even this arsenal seems to be not enough to the Pentagon, it feels restricted in the traditional three dimensions of the battlefields of the past. It is

out to use for a future war and fourth dimension--outer space.

Five new nuclear warheads are added to the U.S. nuclear arsenal daily. The production of booster rockets of various types continues at an enormous rate, the "Star Wars" programme is intensively implemented, nuclear blasts continue, nuclear weapons of the "third generation"--x-ray lasers functioning in an explosion of an atomic bomb are tested, preparations are under way for the launching of killer satellites.

All this senseless buildup of arms, senseless since the idea of ensuring superiority is unattainable, only lessens the security of the United States itself. Yet it is dangerous to the whole world, since it increases the threat of a worldwide nuclear catastrophe. In thinking over the actions of the current administration, one cannot help recalling John Steinbeck, a prominent American writer, who wrote that, as is generally admitted, war in this day and age cannot be won, but is suicidal. And yet the U.S.A. is contemplating it, preparing for it, outlining its strategy and robbing people of their last penny to manufacture arms, which, as we know, will destroy them.

Nevertheless, the strategists of the current U.S. administration are engaged in pursuit of this dangerous policy and will stop at nothing. Moreover by rejecting the Soviet Union's peace initiatives and throwing a challenge to the world community, they intentionally declare for the whole world to hear about their militaristic actions accompanying these statements by strong rhetoric against the USSR. One cannot help asking the question whether the administration really wishes that international tensions be defused and relations with the Soviet Union be bettered. Or it intends to be guided by a policy which has been declared in public the other day by a high-ranking spokesman for the White House, who said that Washington does not plan a policy pending changes in East-West relations, since this, he alleged, is not going to happen in our lifetime? [sentence as received]

#### First-Strike Capability Sought

LD221904 Moscow TASS in English 1731 GMT 22 Aug 85

["Under a False Pretext"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 22 Aug (TASS)--TASS news analyst Vasiliy Kharkov writes:

The U.S. Administration, which has decided to conduct a combat test of anti-satellite weapons in the near future, is also escalating in every way the buildup of ground-based nuclear arms potentials. This is true, in particular, of strategic nuclear armaments. Deputy White House Press Secretary Larry Speakes said in Los Angeles on Wednesday [21 August] that the Washington leadership intended by all means to carry through in full its plan to deploy 100 intercontinental ballistic missiles MX in combat positions.

One hundred missiles, no fewer, and as soon as possible -- that was the message conveyed by Speakes.

The Washington Administration has no intention of reckoning with the resolution passed by the congressional conference committee as it discussed the U.S. military budget for fiscal 1986.

The resolution said that not more than 50 MX missiles were to be installed in the existing U.S. launching silos. But the White House and the Pentagon are bent on having their way, bypassing the resolution of the conference committee and installing 100 first-strike missiles.

The White House is not in the least confused by its strange logic. The U.S. Administration has made so much efforts to present the large-scale space based ABM defences it is developing as a "defensive shield" against strategic nuclear weapons. If we are to believe that space weapons lead to the elimination of nuclear armaments, as Washington claims, why then is it so stubborn in pushing through the strategic MX missile programme?

In reality, the nuclear arms race which Washington has unleashed on earth and its striving to spread into space is pursuing the sole objective of securing the possibility to deliver the first nuclear strike and ensuring U.S. military superiority.

It is in this context that we should view also Washington's refusal to follow the example of the Soviet Union, which unilaterally halted all nuclear explosions on August 6, new U.S. nuclear test in Nevada, the desire of the Reagan administration to install all the 100 MX missiles as soon as possible and its decision to combat-test anti-satellite weapons. All these are components of the U.S. military strategic doctrine, which is aimed at winning a nuclear war by the first nuclear strike. This wild-goose chase is fraught with unpredictable consequences for mankind.

#### Ninth Test Conducted

LD232101 Moscow TASS in English 1946 GMT 23 Aug 85

[Text] Washington, August 23 TASS -- The Pentagon today test-fired an MX first-strike intercontinental ballistic missile from an underground silo for the first time today. The missile carrying six unarmed warheads was launched from Vandenberg air base, California State, towards Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific.

This was the 9th out of twenty scheduled MX tests. The ASSOCIATED PRESS stresses that the Pentagon conducted the test in close to real conditions for the first time. The agency stresses that the task of the firing is to bring closer the implementation of the U.S. Air Force's objective of deploying the first ten MX missiles by December 1986. No official report on the results of the firing has so far been made.

CSO: 5200/1388

## SALT/START ISSUES

### TASS: ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL AWARDED B-1 CONTRACT

LD161852 Moscow TASS in English 1822 GMT 16 Aug 85

[Text] Moscow, 16 Aug (TASS)--TASS commentator Yevgeniy Yegorov writes:

The Rockwell International Aerospace Corporation, one of the Pentagon's biggest contractors, received from its patron a new order for a very large sum, eight billion dollars. The corporation is to build fuselages for 82 up-to-date "B-1" strategic bombers. Earlier the corporation had got an order for the construction of the first consignment of 18 such bombers and the first of them was already turned over to the U.S. Air Force in a ceremony at the Offut Airbase on June 29. Senator Barry Goldwater, notorious advocate of the arms race, said with feeling: It is a great day for America.

The contract with "Rockwell International" is just one example showing what a bonanza the Reagan administration's course at the spiralling of the nuclear arms race has brought to the military-industrial complex of the USA. For "B-1" is not just a plane, but a large nuclear-delivery vehicle. Each bomber will carry 30 nuclear cruise missiles of a large range. Altogether, the Pentagon is to be supplied with 100 bombers of this type. According to official estimates, the programme will cost 28 billion dollars. However, it is held already now that 40 billion dollars will be a more realistic figure and one of the reports of the General Accounting Office gives the figure of 100 billion dollars.

Therefore it is not accidental that the military-industrial complex of the USA is a zealous supporter of the nuclear arms race and as fierce an opponent of any measures aimed at its curbing. True, military-industrial corporations do not come out with public statements to this effect. They have no need to do so for the mass media are fully subordinate to them and publish what monopolies wish.

In this case, monopolies are exerting pressure so that the new important initiative of the Soviet Union, the moratorium on all nuclear explosions, be rejected. "Those in the West who have linked their policy with a further intensification of the arms race and who derive considerable profits from that do not want an end to nuclear tests", the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev said in his answers to questions from a TASS correspondent.

"They oppose the moratorium because they do not want the nuclear arms assembly lines to come to a standstill".

The Reagan administration which obediently fulfils the will of the military industrial complex rejected out of hand the new Soviet proposal that the U.S. join in the moratorium and then started shuffling and manoeuvring. These manoeuvres of the U.S. Administration, which is now casting about for the most clever ways to avoid giving an answer to Soviet proposals, show clearly the principled difference in the approach to the problem of ending the nuclear arms race, the most important problem for the destinies of the world. The U.S. newspaper PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER wrote that while President Reagan of the United States talks constantly about the need to develop new missiles and to deploy weapons in outer space, the Soviet leader, quite the contrary, insists that urgent and concrete steps be taken to scale down the arms race. This remark of a prestigious U.S. newspaper accurately reflects the real state of things.

CSO: 5200/1388

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BMEWS IMPROVEMENT DESCRIBED

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 5, May 85 (signed to press 11 May 85 pp 76-77)

[Article by Lt Col V. Pavlov; "BMEWS System Improvement"]

[Text] Judging by the announcements in the Western media, the U.S. is contemplating starting work, in the next few years, on improving the BMEWS system. The system is designed for detecting and tracking intercontinental ballistic missiles and also submarine-launched ballistic missiles. In the first stage it is envisaged essentially to improve the mathematical control of the algorithms of the functioning of all three of the radar posts (RLP) which input to the system. They are deployed in Thule (Greenland), (Great Britain), and Clear (State of Alaska). To achieve this, it is planned to replace the obsolete electronic computing equipment, made up of the IBM 7090 computer, with the next generation of computers, the CDC 170-865, Modcomp 2/75, and the CDC 2551-3.

In the second stage, the construction of a new radar station, with a phased antenna grid in the RLP, will begin in Thule. Ratheon, with whom an 80 million dollar contract has been concluded, will be the general contractor. They intend to mount the radar on the roof of the 4-storey building, built several years ago for the AN/FPS-49 tracking radar. The new radar, as American specialists announce, by its construction and main technical characteristics will be similar to the PAVE PAWS radar except for the FAR aperture, the diameter of which is nearly 25 m. It is planned to place 3,584 elements in the area of the antenna grid and 2,500 of them will be active, i.e., connected directly to the transmission module (each will produce an output impulse of about 300 W of power).

It is considered that the presence in the radar of two identical FARs will allow conducting a sweep of a 240° sector in azimuth rather than the 160° which is being provided by the four AN/FPS-50 radars. Data from this RLP will be transmitted directly to the command posts of the U.S. Strategic Air Command and the headquarters of the North American Continent Air and Space Defense Command (NORAD). The radar at the Thule site is scheduled to begin operation

in October 1986. After work is completed, it is intended to replace the station in the RLP at Fylingdales Moor, however, the final selection of its type has not yet been made.

COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye," 1985

9355

CSO: 1801/253

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

U.S. SECOND GENERATION CRUISE MISSILES DISCUSSED

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 5, May 85 (Signed to press 11 May 85 pp 56-59

[Article by Col V. Kirsanov; "Developing Second Generation Cruise Missiles in the USA"]

[Text] In a bid to tilt in its favor at any price the parity in strategic weapons established toward the end of the 70s, and thereby secure for the United States military supremacy over the Soviet Union, the Reagan Administration undertook, at the beginning of this decade, to carry out a multifaceted program for modernizing the strategic TRIAD, one of whose components, along with land-based and sea-based missile forces, is strategic aviation. According to Western press reports, the primary vehicle for fulfilling [this program] involves upgrading aviation assets by modernizing existing aircraft, designing new models and developing promising offensive systems, first and foremost air-launched cruise missiles.

It was in 1974 that the U.S. embarked on the development of cruise missiles, which were intended for the strategic bomber arsenal. In November, 1981, production of the AGN-86B air-launched cruise missile got underway in Kent (Washington state) at a specially-built Boeing production site. Within a year, the facility reached projected capacity, amassing 40 such missiles every month. Even when completion of the serial production program for the AGN-86B missile seemed to be far in the future, foreign press accounts strongly suggested that virtually from the outset of the operational phase, strategic aviation units had identified very serious deficiencies in the new weaponry. For example, the bulletin AEROSPACE DAILY noted that the accuracy of the cruise missiles was substantially lower than the projected value, mainly because of operational errors in the inertial unit and the radio altimeter. In this context, several American experts recommended a complete halt in the AGM-86B's serial production and favored commencing at once to develop a later generation of more advanced cruise missiles.

During all this, the following arguments were espoused. By the end of the 1980s, as a result of the USSR's developing and deploying the most advanced types of avionic and missile systems, a sharp increase in the effectiveness of existing cruise missiles will occur. This is precisely what THE WASHINGTON POST stated in February 1983, citing the annual reports to the Congress made

by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Breakthroughs in various fields of "Stealth" technology--making it possible, as it were, to develop "undetectable missiles"--could be expected in the next few years. This would seriously hamper the radar, infrared and optical detection capabilities in an enemy's air defense system. And, finally, certain accomplishments in producing new kinds of small-sized jet engines with greater thrust and decreased fuel consumption, would increase the missile's effective range by no less than 1.5-2 fold.

In the beginning of 1983, the Pentagon, taking these and other factors into account, formulated a tactical-systems project, in which the leading U.S. aerospace corporations were invited to examine the possibility of developing a second generation of cruise missiles and to present their findings for review by the Air Force's Weapon Systems Development Command. After examining the projects elaborated by Boeing, Lockheed and General Dynamics, Air Force specialists endorsed the latter's proposal as the most viable and interesting. Within this context, in April, 1983, General Dynamics was awarded a contract to proceed with the full-fledged development of a new cruise missile given the conditional designation ACM (Advanced Cruise Missile).

Citing statements by senior Pentagon officials, the Western press reported that the primary efforts in developing the missile will be focused on increasing its effective range and enhancing its survivability by drawing extensively upon the achievements made in "Stealth" technology. Expanding upon these announcements, the American bulletin AEROSPACE DAILY noted that the U.S. Air Force has operational requirements for the ACM to surpass the AGM-86B cruise missile, not only in range and speed but also in accuracy, maneuverability and functional reliability.

At the present time, according to foreign press accounts, development of the ACM is proceeding as planned. American specialists intend to increase the flight range and speed in the near term by equipping it with a new engine. Its design was undertaken in the summer of 1982 by Williams International, which was awarded nearly 65 million dollars by the Air Force to pursue that effort. A number of changes, introduced into the structure of the F107-WR-101 engine, which was installed in the AGM-86B missile, made it possible to develop a more efficient engine, the F107-WR-103. Reports noted, in particular, that, by comparison with the previous model, it has 40 per cent more thrust and a net fuel consumption that is 5 per cent less. Its further development gave rise to yet another version, designated F112-WR-100. It is this fundamentally-new turbofan engine, serial production of which is projected to start in 1987, which, in the view of U.S. Air Force specialists, will provide the missile a flight range of up to 4,200 km. The foreign press focuses attention on the extremely high reliability of this engine, which makes it possible to establish a planned maintenance schedule and servicing cycle once every five years rather than the once-in-three-year schedule required for the F107-WR-101.

With an eye toward more long-range plans, the U.S. has conducted broad-based research into developing fundamentally new and even more efficient engines. Thus, the American bulletin DEFENSE WEEKLY wrote that promising types of cruise missiles will be equipped with regenerative-type turbojet or turbofan

engines in which a portion of the thermal energy of the exhaust gases will be recycled to the engine through a special heat exchanger. This will substantially increase the efficiency of fuel combustion and thereby provide additional flight range. It is emphasized that while the idea itself is not new, its technical realization has been hampered by problems associated with developing an adequately reliable light-weight, small-scale heat exchanger. Specialists plan to solve the problem of developing such heat exchangers by drawing extensively on ceramic materials.

Another specific area of inquiry involves developing so-called compound ducted-fan engines and engines with eccentric compressor or turbine configuration. In the case of the first type of engine, which has a high degree of ducting, the compressor is driven by a high-speed diesel (up to 8,000 rpm). As to the second type of engine, the compressor's final stage, the combustion chamber and the turbine are installed at a certain angle (or parallel) to the axis of the first stages. The journal FLIGHT has noted that the turbine blades in the experimental model of this type of engine were made of heat-resistant alloys containing niobium. This made it possible to test it at an operating temperature on the order of 1,400° C. Preliminary evaluations show that these engines have a reduced net fuel consumption and increased thrust.

In tandem with developing such structurally unusual engines, research in the United States is focusing on new types of fuel with greater heat-generating properties than those of JP-9 and JP-10, which are now used in the engines of present-generation cruise missiles. Furthermore, new types of fuel will have greater density. This will bring about a decrease in the missile's overall weight and an extension of its flight range.

The development of radically-new types of engine also envisages structural uses of materials not commonly employed in missile production and capable of withstanding high temperature levels for extended periods of time. For example, the journal INTERAVIA wrote that the U.S. is researching several kinds of materials which fully retain their properties at temperatures up to 3,500° C. It is anticipated that they will be used to produce turbines for promising types of jet engines. In particular, it has been reported that the most encouraging results have come from research into ceramic and carbon-composite materials.

The latter will also be used to make structural components of the housing and the aerodynamic surfaces of the cruise missile. American experts claim that this will substantially reduce the effective radar cross section and weight and, as a consequence, increase the flight range. Practical applications of carbon-composite materials as components of the space shuttle's heat-protection shield give reason to assume that cruise missiles, as DEFENSE WEEKLY points out, very well may fly even at supersonic speeds.

Research into possible applications of composite materials is only one aspect of wide-range efforts which the U.S. has termed the "Stealth" program. According to Western press reports, ventures undertaken in this context are intended to reduce the general identification features of all types of airborne systems--planes, helicopters and missiles. As part of the program,

special measures are being developed to hamper detection of cruise missiles by air defense electronic devices. For example, to shield the missile, consideration is being given to using radio-absorbing coatings, changing the shape and configuration of the air intake and ensuring a reduced temperature level for the exhaust gases. In addition, efforts are underway to devise a series of measures which will decrease missiles' noise levels and their electromagnetic and heat radiation. Thought is also being given to ways of substantially increasing the smoothness of the body and wing surfaces. It is believed that by accomplishing all of these efforts, the effective radar cross section of the ACM missile will decrease by almost an order of magnitude as compared with that of the AGM-86B cruise missile.

The increase in the cruise missile's flight range is accompanied by a sharp rise in requirements placed upon the guidance systems that are installed in it. In evaluating the capabilities of the guidance system found in existing cruise missiles, the journal INTERAVIA noted that it is not an optimal system that is suitable for use in promising cruise missiles with intended flight ranges. This is because it poses serious difficulties in isolating errors within the inertial unit caused by gyroscope "precession," resulting in missile deviation from the planned trajectory by as much as 900 meters during one hour of flight time. Furthermore, this kind of system lacks the capability to redirect the missile after it has been fired from an airborne launcher. This significantly limits its flexibility in terms of combat application. In this context, U.S. Air Force specialists are studying the question of developing more advanced inertial systems and requisite speed vector measuring devices which will employ doppler lasers with a 10.6 mkm wave length.

Much attention is also being given to research into the prospects of using the NAVSTAR system to guide the ACM missile to its target. By using its signals, the onboard system, according to American specialists, will be able to determine, at preset time intervals, the cruise missile's spatial position with a level of error not exceeding 18 m and its speed with an accuracy of up to 0.1 m/sec. To achieve the optimal flight trajectory, the cruise missile's onboard computer is being furnished with an array of complex programs, allowing for automatic assessment of danger levels expressed as a function of the magnitude and direction of the enemy's ground radar pulses. By comparing the pulses from various radars, the onboard computer will select the missile's safest and optimal flight path to the target, while also considering the amount of fuel remaining onboard.

As a radical solution to the question of the cruise missile's target accuracy, American experts suggest using an autonomous guidance system on the final leg of the flight trajectory. This kind of system must contain sensors operating in the infrared and optical wave band which will enable it automatically to compare the factual image obtained by them [the sensors] with the data about [the image] stored in the onboard computer memory. The assumption is that the information entering the computer will permit not only target identification and missile guidance to targets, but also assessments, as required, of damage levels caused by detonating other kinds of munitions. At the same time, the ground will be laid for developing an automated system capable of redirecting cruise missiles to targets still intact. In general, the guidance system being developed for second-generation cruise missiles has to be a multi-

channel and highly accurate one, which can function during any weather conditions and at extremely low altitudes. According to reports in AEROSPACE DAILY, cruise missiles equipped with such a system, whether in a nuclear or conventional mode, will be able to strike effectively at both fixed and moving targets.

At the same time that it embarked on the development of second-generation cruise missiles, the U.S. Air Force command re-evaluated the program for serial production of AGM-86B missiles. In particular, instead of producing 4,300 missiles of this type, plans call for making only 1,715 units and completing their deployment within components of the Strategic Air Command by the end of 1986. As part of this effort, an accelerated development cycle is envisaged for the ACM cruise missile so as to begin flight tests on experimental models in 1986, commence serial production in 1987-8, and produce 1,300-1,500 second-generation cruise missiles within a few years thereafter. Overall expenses, including research and development, test and evaluation and serial production costs to the ACM missile are expected to reach some 6 billion dollars.

Pentagon strategists estimate that, as a result of these programs, the United States will be able to have 3,000-3,200 air-launched cruise missiles by the middle of the 1990s. Some 50 percent of these will be second-generation ACMs. In their view, equipping B-52 bombers and then the B-1B and ATBs with these cruise missiles will increase the U.S.'s ability to conduct its policy of acting "from a position of strength." However, as the experience of recent decades indicates, all such attempts have usually marked only the start of another spiral in the arms race since the USSR cannot but consider the threat to its security arising from these efforts and cannot but undertake appropriate countermeasures.

COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye," 1985

9355

CSO: 1801/253

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRENCH NUCLEAR BUILD-UP DISCUSSED

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 5, May 85 (signed to press 11 May 85 p 75)

[Article by Col E. Zorin; "The Build-up of French Nuclear Potential"]

[Text] The French National Assembly approved the country's 1985 national budget, of which 16.6 percent (151.5 billion francs) was allocated to the Ministry of Defense. By Western observers' estimate, the distinguishing feature of this year's military budget is that the lion's share--33 per cent is designated for a further build up of the country's nuclear potential.

Development of the ADES tactical mobile guided missile, with a nuclear warhead, intended as a replacement for the PLUTON guided missile in the ground forces is continuing. Six hundred fifty million francs have been appropriated this year for this program.

Work is planned for the further hardening the medium-range S-3 ballistic missile silos against the influence of electromagnetic impulse and nuclear detonation shock waves.

Resources have been ear-marked for purchasing the first 16 MIRAGE-2000 aircraft. They will be equipped with ASMP medium-range air-to-ground guided missiles with nuclear warheads. The modernization of 11 MIRAGE-4 medium strategic bombers with externally-carried ASMP guided missiles is contemplated (7 of them have been reequipped already). The first squadron of these aircraft is scheduled to enter the air force in 1987.

In naval aviation, part of the SUPER ENTANDARD carrier aircraft is being refitted also to carry the ASMP guided missile (flight tests of the first model have begun already).

As noted in the foreign media, in April of this year, the PLARB (SSBN) INFLEXIBLE, armed with 16 M4 ballistic missiles with multiple warheads, entered service--the 6th SSBN in the French fleet. The first five are presently equipped with M20 missiles with single warheads. The rearmament of four SSBNs (except REDOUBTABLE) with M4 missiles is envisioned.

In the 1985 military budget, 1,552 million francs are allocated for developing a new generation of SSBNs for the 1990s. The order for the construction of the lead submarine is scheduled to be placed in 1987. Its construction, according to NATO experts' calculation, will take from 3-5 years.

In 1985, France's military budget, as acknowledged by Charles (??????), the defense minister, will grow, in real value, by 7.66 percent.

COPYRIGHT: "Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye," 1985

9355

CSO: 1801/253

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRG REPORTS CLAIMS U.S. NEUTRON BOMBS TO BE DEPLOYED

'Monitor' Program Carries Story

LD031407 Hamburg DPA in German 1339 GMT 3 Sep 85

[Text] Cologne, 3 Sep (DPA) -- According to the information of the WDR television magazine program "Monitor," neutron warheads to be deployed in Western Europe were produced in the United States from 1981 to 1984. The television magazine will report on Tuesday evening, according to the WDR press office in Cologne, that "around 400 neutron warheads" have been built "for each of the 'Lance' missile systems and the 203-mm heavy artillery system." The report is based on documents from the U.S. Congress. Both weapons systems are deployed with the U.S. Army in the Federal Republic.

"Monitor" has also learned that a so-called double component system is being developed with which the Americans want to dispel the Europeans' reservations about the deployment of neutron weapons. One element remains in the United States and the other is to be deployed in Western Europe. "When a corresponding decision has been taken and the allies do not have any more bellyaches," the missing elements are to be put together in Europe to make neutron warheads, "Monitor" quotes NATO Commander in Chief General Bernard Rogers as saying to a committee of the House of Representatives of 16 March 1984.

The procurement is part of the modernization program for the tactical nuclear weapons of the U.S. Army in Central Europe, to which the NATO defense ministers agreed in principle in 1983. It is incomprehensible, "Monitor" says, that Defense Minister Manfred Woerner stated in the Bundestag on 13 June 1985: "The American Army has up to now not even requested from Congress the resources to produce neutron weapons, never mind wanting to deploy them here in Europe, for example."

Defense Ministry Denies Story

LD031555 Hamburg DPA in German 1511 GMT 3 Sep 85

[Text] Bonn, 3 Sep (DPA) -- The federal Defense Ministry with regard to the [WDR Television Program] "Monitor" report, has said that neutron warheads are not deployed on the territory of the Federal Republic. There is also no intention to position such weapons here. It is also not possible to change nuclear warheads into neutron weapons in Europe at a later date.

CSO: 5200/2765

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

WESTERN NATIONS, JAPAN MEET ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

BK110157 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0130 GMT 11 Sep 85

[Text] It has been revealed that Australia is playing a leading role in an effort to develop unified and standardized regulations for the international sale and use of chemical agents. A spokesman for the Foreign Affairs Department in Canberra confirmed that Australia had hosted two secret meetings of Western nations in the Belgian capital, Brussels, on chemical weapons. The first conference was held in June and the second meeting last week. The spokesman said the meetings were complementary and supplementary to the arms control talks in Geneva. He said if progress was made, the Western nations involved planned to invite nonaligned and Eastern bloc countries to put their views. The spokesman said the first conference in June had been promising, and although the government had not yet received an official report back from last week's meeting, there seemed to have been further progress.

Radio Australia European correspondent (Mark Calvin) says that beside Australia, representatives from the 10 member countries of the European Economic Community, the United States, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand attended the latest conference.

CSO: 5200/2769

**CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS**

**FRG'S WOERNER DEFENDS ROLE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS**

DW061000 Cologne Westdeutscher Rundfunk Television Network in German 1452 GMT  
5 Sep 85

[Speech by Defense Minister Manfred Woerner during the Bundestag budget debate -- live]

[Excerpts] Ladies and gentlemen: No one asks today in America, in France or in Great Britain where the German road leads. Today the German road is plain -- we have become capable of acting again in security policy. That is the decisive merit of the CDU/CSU and FDP government, ladies and gentlemen. [applause]

He who wants to represent German interests -- and the paramount interest is peace and freedom -- must know that peace and freedom can be maintained only as long as the Bundeswehr is ready for action and as long as the alliance is intact, ladies and gentlemen. [applause] That is the decisive point. And if change is called into question, it is here that the decisive change in German policy occurs, a change in the interest of FRG citizens. When we started, ladies and gentlemen, loudmouth groups here in the FRG also had a say in security and defense policy. At the time it was possible to show the Bundeswehr only when it was permitted. Today the time has passed when loudmouthed minorities can decide on whether the Bundeswehr can be shown to the public. Today the number of public vows has tripled. This Federal Government is on the soldiers' side, not only with words, but also with deeds. This, too, constitutes a decisive change. [applause, shouts]

When we started, there was no longer any binding planning for the Bundeswehr. Today the Bundeswehr's planning extends for more than a decade. Here we have a change -- a change for the better.

Ladies and gentlemen, colleague Ehmke talked about chemical weapons. To begin with, it must be said he created the impression that the SPD was interested in the withdrawal of chemical weapons from the FRG, thereby implying that we do not want to protect the German people. He maintained indirectly that we are in favor of chemical weapons, if not in favor of their use.

Ladies and gentlemen, I feel that this is a low blow, that it is outright shameless. Mr Ehmke, I tell you that you ought to know as well as we do that there has been no party besides the CDU/CSU that has worked so energetically for decades to banish all chemical weapons from this world, and which advocates a verifiable ban on not only the possession, but also on the production of chemical weapons. This Federal Government, under the leadership of Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, has always represented that position, internationally and domestically. We are the ones who submitted proposals in Geneva as to how checks and verifications of the ban could be made. That is why I consider it dishonest if you try to make believe that there

are people here who are for and others who are against chemical weapons. [applause] Away with chemical weapons! However, this must be so everywhere in the world, ladies and gentlemen. [commotion]

This brings us to an interesting point. Colleague Ehmke acted here -- as he has done in another respect, too, to which I will refer later on -- by speaking in a stentorian tone and conjuring up morality without saying a single word about the fact that the Americans in 1969 unilaterally renounced the production of chemical weapons. That is 16 years ago! There actually are quite a few people here, among the Greens and among the SPD, who say: Take the initiative, and when you have done so, the Soviets will certainly follow suit. A decisive initiative was undertaken. For 16 years the Americans renounced chemical weapons production, and what was done by the Soviets?

The Soviets continued to produce chemical weapons and today they possess more than half a million tons of chemical weapons, ladies and gentlemen, and Mr Ehmke babbles about chemical weapons, (?addressing us) without wasting a word, while the Soviet Union has had the time for 16 years to reciprocate the unilateral American initiative. [applause]

Then the question arises -- and this is the second most important point -- what is to be done if we do not succeed in banishing chemical weapons from the world. [shouts] It was the FRG of its own free will that was the first country that not only renounced production, but also the possession and deployment of chemical weapons. So if we actually do not succeed in banishing chemical weapons then the next attempt must certainly be to prevent chemical weapons from ever being used. That means that if one cannot compel the Soviet to renounce chemical weapons one must see to it that the risk of using chemical weapons will be too high for them. And for this reason, ladies and gentlemen, the West still maintains a certain potential -- by the way, a very small potential -- of chemical weapons [shouts] so as to make the use of chemical weapons in a conflict impossible.

There are two illustrative examples: The first is World War I, when chemical weapons were used. The second is World War II, in which chemical weapons were not used, although both sides possessed them; and now one must say because both sides possess them.

As a matter of fact, it is absolutely clear that at the very moment -- and I am saying this to the gentleman of the Greens, who spoke here -- that if the West would deprive itself of any chemical potential, then the Soviet Union would be in a position to use chemical weapons unpunished, and it would do so, ladies and gentlemen. At any rate the threat would suffice so as to bring about the FRG's and the West's defeat in a conflict or even in a crisis. That is why one must see to it, if one is not in a position to make chemical weapons disappear, that they are not used. That is the purpose, the sole purpose, of the West's existing chemical potential.

Now I arrive at the point that was tackled by colleague Klejdzinski: the stockpiling of chemical weapons here in the FRG. I can only say that this fits perfectly into the picture that I had drawn before. Ladies and gentlemen, you were the government for 13 years. You held government responsibility for 13 years in the FRG. During all those 13 years, certain American chemical weapons were stockpiled here in the FRG. [shouts]

Well, ladies and gentlemen, I have taken over -- so to speak -- this stockpile. Not a single piece has been added. And now Mr Klejdzinski asks me what I think about it. Mr Klejdzinski you should ask yourself about what you did during those 13 years, if you are against stockpiling. After all, you maintained this chemical potential

here in the FRG for the very reasons I just described -- and I do not complain about it. It was not because Federal Chancellor Schmidt wanted to use it, not because my predecessor Leber or Apel were friends of chemical weapons. They were not, just as this defense minister is not. It was because the entire Western alliance says up to this day: With a view to preventing the Warsaw Pact from using chemical weapons we need at least the number that would be necessary for a reprisal so that chemical weapons will never be used. That is the only reason.

And now you have my answer, which matches the answer of your government: It is not we who have changed our view but you, Mr Klejdzinski, who comes here and professes that something is immoral now that was tolerated all those years. [applause, commotion]

Ladies and gentlemen, a nuclear weapon free zone does not guarantee that a nuclear bomb will not be dropped there. On the contrary, it would be an attractive target for nuclear weapons. A chemical weapon free zone does not guarantee at all, ladies and gentlemen, that no chemical weapons will be used there. On the contrary. As long as the Soviet Union is not prepared to renounce chemical weapons and accept verification it would be almost attractive for it to use chemical weapons in an area where it knows that the adversary has no such weapons. Germany, as a chemical weapon free zone does not help FRG and GDR citizens at all. You know why General Rogers, the commander in chief of the Atlantic alliance in Europe, correctly called it nonsense. You can transport chemical weapons overnight from the USSR to the GDR without anyone being the wiser. That presents no problem at all.

Our country is safe. No war threatens us. Our freedom is not in danger. The fact that this is so, is first of all due to the alliance, the Bundeswehr, and the policy of a federal government, which, in 3 years, has done everything to keep the Bundeswehr ready for action and the alliance able to operate. [applause]

CSO: 5200/2768

**CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS**

The following material has been selected from recent open-source publications. The views expressed are those of the original source and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Joint Publications Research Service or the Defense Intelligence Agency.

THE "TOP SECRET" SOURCE CITE'S THE FOLLOWING: "The German government has decided to ban the production of chemical weapons and to ban their storage on German soil. This decision was taken by the government on 20 August 1985. The decision is to be implemented by 1990."

ANOTHER "TOP SECRET" SOURCE CITE'S THE FOLLOWING: "The CDU/CSU continues to reject the storing of chemical weapons on German soil. Should the United States resume its production because of a Soviet refusal to agree to a worldwide ban on chemical weapons, the CDU/CSU is "with undiminished emphasis" in favor of no new chemical weapons being stored in the Federal Republic and of all those now stored being removed. This was stated by the disarmament spokesman of the CDU/CSU Bundestag group, Juergen Todenhoefer, in Bonn on Sunday. For the CDU/SCU the "worldwide and reliably verifiable scrapping of all chemical weapons" is of the highest priority. [Text] [Hamburg DPA in German 0940 GMT 8 Sep 85 LD]"

**BRIEFS**

FRG PARTY OPPOSED WEAPONS STORING--Bonn, 8 Sep (DPA)--The CDU/CSU continues to reject the storing of chemical weapons on German soil. Should the United States resume its production because of a Soviet refusal to agree to a worldwide ban on chemical weapons, the CDU/CSU is "with undiminished emphasis" in favor of no new chemical weapons being stored in the Federal Republic and of all those now stored being removed. This was stated by the disarmament spokesman of the CDU/CSU Bundestag group, Juergen Todenhoefer, in Bonn on Sunday. For the CDU/SCU the "worldwide and reliably verifiable scrapping of all chemical weapons" is of the highest priority. [Text] [Hamburg DPA in German 0940 GMT 8 Sep 85 LD]

CSO: 5200/2769

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: U.S. OPPOSES, USSR SUPPORTS NUCLEAR-FREE NORTH EUROPE

LD092216 Moscow TASS in English 2155 GMT 9 Aug 85

[Text] Moscow, 10 Aug (TASS)--TASS news analyst Valeriy Vavilov writes:

"Nuclear weapons should never be used, either on earth or in outer space, nuclear weapons should be eliminated in full and for all time. Establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe is a step in that direction." This is the keynote of a series of mass actions of the North European anti-war organisations being held in time for the 40th anniversary of the American barbarous atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

More than two decades ago President of Finland Urho Kaleva Kekkonen formulated the idea of establishing a nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe. But the idea has not so far been materialized, though it is supported by the majority of the population of the Scandinavian countries. This is attributed above all to the opposition from the United States and NATO. It is no secret that the Pentagon views the north of Europe as a possible springboard for unleashing a nuclear-missile war and, disregarding the opinion of peoples and governments, it plans to deploy on the territory of a number of northern NATO countries not only troops and arsenals of armaments, but also nuclear weapons.

Realizing the danger which comes from the United States and NATO, the representatives of the Scandinavian peoples, meeting in Holmenkollen, stated the intention to invigorate the struggle against the nuclear threat, for proclamation of northern Europe a nuclear-free zone.

The Soviet Union, which supports the idea of establishing a nuclear-free zone in the north of Europe, is ready to take concrete steps to put that idea into life.

CSO: 5200/1389

**NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS**

**TASS CRITICIZES NORWAY OPPOSITION TO NORTH EUROPE ZONE**

LD271624 Moscow TASS in English 1516 GMT 27 Aug 85

[Text] Moscow, 27 Aug (TASS)--TASS news analyst Valeriy Vavilov writes:

Norway's Defence Minister Anders Sjaastad has again declared against the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. Addressing an annual conference of representatives of Norwegian Armed Forces, he motivated his objections by the claim that Norway's accession to the demand of the peoples of the Scandinavian countries for declaring Northern Europe to be a nuclear-free zone will hardly meet with understanding from the United States and the West European countries.

It is amazing that the Norwegian minister should express concern not with the interests of his compatriots, but be more interested in how such a vital action would be received in Washington.

Yet the minister is sure to know that an overwhelming majority of the population of Norway like the other Nordic countries, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland, does not accept nuclear weapons on its territory and declares in support of the idea of turning Northern Europe into a nuclear-free zone, which was specifically spelled out by President Urho Kekkonen of Finland more than two decades ago.

The idea of a nuclear-free north has met with broad support in Sweden, which put forward the proposal that a zone free from battlefield nuclear weapons be created. Some territories in Denmark, in particular in Faeroe Islands unanimously voted for a non-nuclear status for their country, and Greenland's parliament unanimously declared against the deployment of nuclear weapons on the island both in peace and in wartime.

An identical decision has been passed by the Icelandic Althing (parliament), which prohibited the deployment of nuclear weapons both in the country and the calls of U.S and NATO naval ships with nuclear weapons on board at Iceland's ports and territorial waters.

Recently tens of thousands of Norwegians, Danes, Swedes and Finns demonstrated in Holmenkollen near Oslo their ardent support for the idea of nuclear-free Nordic Europe and declared their determination to fight for peace and disarmament, against the threat of a nuclear catastrophe.

The Soviet Union solidarizes with the demand put forward by the Scandinavian public that a nuclear-free zone be created in the north of Europe. The implementation of that demand could become an important step towards ensuring the security of peoples in that region,

to delivering the European continent from nuclear weapons. Expressing support for that idea, the USSR declared its readiness to take concrete steps for its implementation.

Norway's defence minister taking the lead from Washington, which is the main opponent of nuclear-free Nordic Europe and is reluctant to heed the voice of the peoples of the Scandinavian countries, the voice of reason, is expressing the fear that the creation of a nuclear-free zone and the inclusion of Norway into it will reduce the role and significance of Norway in NATO, which, as he alleges, will adversely affect her authority and prestige in the international arena. He prefers to remain loyal to the Pentagon's "strategic concept of the defence of the NATO's northern flank", in which Norway is assigned an unseemly role.

By lashing out against the idea of a nuclear-free zone, the minister may enhance his prestige at the Pentagon, but this will hardly happen in his own country and in Northern Europe as a whole.

CSO: 5200/1389

## NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

**USSR: GREECE WANTS U.S. BASES OUT AS PART OF BALKAN NFZ PLAN**

**PM271244 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Aug 85 First Edition p 5**

[Nikolay Miroshnik "Commentator's Column": "Plain Truth"]

[Text] The latest trip to Athens by the Pentagon's emissary, U.S. General B. Rogers, NATO supreme allied commander Europe, has ended fruitlessly. Greece's foreign policy line, and particularly its special position in NATO, remain unaltered, the country's official spokesman declared at the conclusion of Rogers' talks with the Greek leadership.

What the general was actually seeking were changes in this sphere. He was not alone in this respect. Official representatives of Washington have literally thronged the Greek capital this summer. Behind closed doors, the transatlantic visitors attempted to apply a tactic which THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR described as "pressure without ultimatums."

The United States and its closest NATO allies have repeatedly resorted to this tactic toward Greece over the last few years. They resumed with renewed efforts following last June's parliamentary elections, when the Panhellenic Socialist Movement scored an impressive victory. Initially, people in NATO capitals expressed hope that the socialist leadership would "soften" its stance on questions of detente and disarmament, which had aroused the Atlanticists' displeasure repeatedly in the past. Perhaps, now was the time for Greece to "come to its senses," having gratified voters with peace-loving slogans and attracted their support.

But this was not to be. The Greek Government's declarations reaffirmed its resolve to remove U.S. military bases from the country and to work for the transformation of the Balkans into a nuclear-free zone. There were no changes in the line of maintaining an independent approach toward the solution of international problems on the basis of Greece's national interests, instead of unconditional subordination to "NATO discipline."

There was anxiety in Washington and in NATO's Brussels headquarters. But they could think of nothing new, apart from the same old countermeasures in the form of alternating "the carrot and the stick." The persuasion by numerous transatlantic intercessors is, as before, backed up by various "sanctions."

It must be stated that so far pressure on Athens has yielded no real results, and this can be explained. Opinion polls held in Greece over the last few years have invariably confirmed that the overwhelming majority of the population disapproves of both the

country's membership in NATO and the presence of U.S. bases. It was this majority that enabled the socialists to remain in power for another term. Today it is no longer possible to ignore the feelings of the broad masses. But neither Washington nor Brussels is willing to accept this plain truth.

CSO: 5200/1389

JPRS-TAC-85-032  
19 September 1985

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET PAPER NOTES JAPANESE PREFECTURE NFZ

[Editorial Report] Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 33 publishes on 14 August on page 14 a 1,000-word article APN correspondent M. Yefimov entitled "Gov-rnor of a Nuclear-Free Zone." The article describes an interview with Governor Kadzudzi Nagasu of Kanagawa Prefecture, which declared itself a nuclear-free zone in June of last year. The article notes that Kanagawa is one of the largest prefectures in Japan and the site of a large number of U.S. military bases, including the home port of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

CSO: 5200/1389

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

SYDNEY EDITORIAL LAUDS RAROTONGA TREATY

Sydney THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD in English 10 Aug 85 p 26

[Editorial: "The Talks at Rarotonga"]

[Text]

MR HAWKE did very well at the Rarotonga South Pacific Forum meeting to get his Nuclear Free Zone Treaty through when it might very well have been referred back to the island member states for further study and deliberation. Its unexpected carriage on the first day, with Vanuatu predictably the only dissenting member, was in effect a vote of confidence in Australian and New Zealand endorsement of the need for such a treaty.

While Mr Lange's government has banned US nuclear-ship visits, and intends legislating to that effect, it fully supported the treaty. In particular it supported the provisions allowing each Forum country to determine for itself whether to adopt a similar ban and allowing freedom of passage for nuclear ships through the exclusive economic zones of Forum signatory states, as well as on the high seas. While the US has been very cautious in its official statements some of its State Department leaks indicate concern. It is misplaced concern. The treaty as it stands represents the best deal the US

is likely to get from tiny but independent and increasingly nuclear-conscious South Pacific states.

The treaty provides for a South Pacific nuclear-free zone in which no treaty signatory will develop, manufacture, acquire or receive nuclear explosive devices or will test or station weapons in its territory. Each signatory opposes nuclear waste dumping in the zone. The treaty has three protocols. One invites France, the UK and US to apply the treaty's provisions to their remaining South Pacific territories. The other two invite the five nuclear weapons states to attest that they will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against treaty signatories or test nuclear weapons within the zone.

The chief US consideration is not to offend France, one of its prime European allies, which the Treaty places under great pressure. Another is the demonstration effect that the treaty may have in other areas of the world where the US has a nuclear presence by arrangement. Last, and probably least, is US concern that the treaty in

defining a nuclear-free zone and its obligations should not encourage signatories to adopt New Zealand's position and refuse port access to nuclear ships. Washington should realise that the treaty has been the means of containing wavering Forum states from adopting the position taken by New Zealand and Vanuatu by offering a reasonable package deal to signatories on all matters of nuclear concern to them.

Clearly it cannot be a treaty to satisfy everyone. For a start here at home it does not satisfy Mr Peacock and Mr Spender who seem to believe that the treaty will encourage Mr Lange to legislate against nuclear ship visits (he needs no encouragement) and anger the US by banning US ship home porting

here (the US has never seriously considered home porting here). But the treaty is a start on making the region a nuclear-free zone. It will take time but there is a fair chance that the US, followed by the UK, will eventually sign the protocols.

Why shouldn't they? Neither uses the South Pacific to test, store or make nuclear weapons although they can clearly transport them by ship and air. And neither has any intention of using or threatening to use nuclear weapons on signatories. There are legitimate hopes in Canberra that the USSR and China, whose declared nuclear policies rule out the use of nuclear weapons on non-nuclear states, will also sign the protocols for the very same reasons.

CSO: 5200/4355

END